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PERFORMANCE OF A PRE-EXISTING CONTRACTUAL DuTY
AS CONSIDERATION: THE ACTUAL CRITERIA FOR THE
EFFICACY OF AN AGREEMENT ALTERING CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATION
By BURTON F. BRODY*
INTRODUCTION
The rule that performance of, or a promise to perform, a pre-
existing duty cannot serve as consideration to bind a promise has
been the source of extensive comment.' Some writers have taken
the position that the rule is meritorious and have expressed con-
cern that it is sometimes evaded.2 Others have taken the opposite
position, condemned the rule, and condoned its abridgement, if
not its abrogation.' The major cause of these conflicting assess-
ments is the seemingly inconsistent applications of the rule by the
courts.
The apparent contradiction in application is most dramati-
cally demonstrated by two New York decisions in the early 19th
century. In the first opinion, Bartlett v. Wyman,' the Supreme
Court of New York denied recovery to a sailor who sought to be
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law; B.S.C., 1959, De
Paul University College of Commerce; J.D., 1961, De Paul University College of Law.
I J. CALAMAm & J. PEmuLLo, CONTRACTS § 60 et seq. (1970) [hereinafter cited as
CALAMARI & PERILLO]; 1A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 171 et seq. (1963)
[hereinafter cited as CoIRIN]; Ballantine, Is the Doctrine of Consideration Senseless and
Illogical?, 11 MICH. L. REv. 423 (1913); Corbin, Does a Pre-Existing Duty Defeat Con-
sideration, 27 YALE L.J. 362 (1918); Hudson, Doctrine of Consideration in Iowa Revisited
-Discharge or Modification of Duties, 5 DRAKE L. REv. 3 (1955); Williston, Successive
Promises of the Same Performance, 8 HARv. L. REv. 27 (1897) in SELECTED READINGS ON
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 452 (1934); Comment, Modification of a Contract in New York:
Criteria for Enforcement, 35 U. Cm. L. REv. 173 (1967); Comment, Hard Cases Make Good
Law, 33 YALE L.J. 78 (1923). The rationale of the rule is that performance of contractual
duty is not consideration because it is neither a detriment nor a benefit.
2 Hudson, supra note 1, at 14; Williston, supra note 1.
' Comment, Hard Cases Make Good Law, 33 YALE L.J. 78 (1923); Ballantine, supra
note 1.
1 14 Johns. 260 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1817).
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paid at a rate higher than he had originally contracted for. The
higher rate had been agreed to by the captain during the course
of the voyage. Recovery was denied because, "The promise to give
higher wages is void for the want of consideration." ' 5 However, in
the second opinion, Lattimore v. Harsen, the court found a suffi-
cient consideration in a case where builders refused to fulfill their
original contract, but were induced to do so by a promise of higher
payments. Thus the same court, in the same month, within 70
pages of the same volume of the reports, seems to have reached
opposite decisions on similar facts.
The two opinions are more bewildering because the unsuc-
cessful sailor appears to have had the better case on the facts. He
demanded more money after a rumor that Congress was about to
impose an embargo had caused many sailors to switch ships.7
Therefore, his remaining aboard was of some value to the captain.
On the other hand, the builders, with no such mitigating circum-
stances indicated, merely "became dissatisfied with their agree-
ment, and determined to leave off the work . . . . ,, Yet the two
cases stand, and the enigmatic nature of the pre-existing duty
rule endures. The confusion is reinforced by cases holding that
performance of a pre-existing duty does constitute consideration
far more often than a simple statement of the rule would lead one
to believe. Therefore, an attempt to resolve the apparent conflict
is worthwhile.
Contemporary commercial society demands clarification of
the pre-existing duty rule. Increasing technology and the continu-
ing sophistication and refinement of the techniques of doing busi-
ness stretch the time required for the performance of contracts
over ever lengthening periods. These elongated performance peri-
ods result in a proportionate increase in the vulnerability of such
undertakings to the accelerating pace of change in modern so-
ciety.9 And because of changed conditions, there is a greater need
Id. at 262.
14 Johns. 330 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1817).
14 Johns. at 261.
14 Johns. at 330. It may be noted that the cases are distinguishable on the ground
that in Lattimore the original agreement contained a liquidated damages clause. On the
basis of the liquidated damages clause, the court reasoned, the defendant could have had
a remedy for the builder's refusal to perform the first contract; the builder then could be
viewed as having relied on the defendant's having foregone his remedy. The sailor's origi-
nal contract had no similar clause. This paper develops the idea that a "liquidated dam-
ages analysis" is only a judicial technique for carrying out more fundamental principles.
I A. TOFFLER, FurURE SHOCK (1970).
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for, and frequency of, modification of original contracts.
In such a commercial climate, the enigmatic nature of the
pre-existing duty rule is a luxury. This paper proposes to resolve
the inconsistent applications of the rule, draw its boundaries, and
describe the right of the parties to an executory contract to mo-
dify the performances owed under it. Setting the boundaries of
the pre-existing duty rule will also shed light on the rules for
modification of executory bilateral contracts because the prob-
lems are essentially identical. They are actually only views of the
same situation from different perspectives. One is hesitant to
point out the selfsame natures for fear of insulting one's readers.
However, clarity takes priority over good manners and necessi-
tates a brief explanation of the conceptual sameness of the prob-
lems of modification and the pre-existing duty rule.
If one party to an executory bilateral contract alters his per-
formance with the full consent and agreement of both parties,
and the other party does nothing different than was originally
required of him by the contract, the party altering his perform-
ance can allege that his second promise (i.e., his altered perform-
ance) is without consideration and therefore unenforceable. The
effect of the modification is thus destroyed. The basis for such an
allegation is that the second party does nothing different; rather,
he is merely performing what was required of him by the original
contract. Traditional doctrine dictates that the performance of a
pre-existing duty cannot, for this reason, be consideration for a
promise. Thus, the pre-existing duty rule and modification of
contract are inextricably intertwined and analysis of one must
include the other.
This analysis of these intertwined problems will establish the
following:
First. One of the significant functions of the pre-
existing duty rule is the prevention of extortion, abusive
dealing, and economic coercion by denying enforcement
to modifications in situations where courts suspect such
practices.
Second. In modification cases, the pre-existing duty
rule begs the question. The issue is not whether there
is consideration for the second promise (the modifica-
tion wherein one party agrees to pay more for the same
service): but rather, the issue is the justification of the
party receiving the promise of greater remuneration for
1975
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refusing to perform the original contract. The efficacy
of a modification will, to a large extent, depend on the
propriety of the refusal to perform the duty created in
the original contract.
Third.. The legal bridge between the pre-existing duty
rule and an enforceable modification is the surrender,
by the party receiving the promise of greater remunera-
tion, of a claim arising under the original contract. The
surrender of that claim, in traditional terms, constitutes
the consideration for the promise of greater remunera-
tion. The claim surrendered by the party receiving in-
creased remuneration need only be a claim in which he
has a reasonable and honest belief, as distinct from a
claim that is ultimately legally effective.
This paper is focused on the study of the pre-existing duty
rule as it applies to duties arising under executory contracts. It
is this area in which understanding offers the most benefit. The
other facets of the problem, for example, performance of official
duties as consideration and the payment of less than the full
amount owed, present distinct difficulties either of theory or pol-
icy, which, even if resolved, would contribute little to an under-
standing of modification.
Performance of official duties as consideration will not be
discussed in this paper because the rule prohibiting such consid-
eration is a matter of policy which transcends contract theory.
Policemen, firemen, elected officials, and other public servants
cannot be permitted to peddle their services on a public commer-
cial basis if any modicum of honesty is to be maintained in the
functioning of government. It seems prudent that this social pol-
icy decision should not enter into the analysis of contract doc-
trine.
Ironically, however, just such a commingling of social policy
and contract law may lie at the threshold of the seeming inconsis-
tency of the pre-existing duty rule. An early case, Harris v.
Watson,10 concerned a sailor seeking to be paid at a rate higher
than he had originally signed aboard for. Lord Kenyon found
against the sailor and made the policy point quite clearly:
If this action was to be supported, it would materially affect the
navigation of this kingdom. It has been long since determined, that
M 170 Eng. Rep. 94 (K.B. 1791).
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when the freight is lost, the wages are also lost. . . . This rule was
founded on a principle of policy, for if sailors were in all events to
have their wages, and in times of danger entitled to insist on an extra
charge on such a promise as this, they would in many cases suffer a
ship to sink, unless the captain would pay any extravagant demand
they might think proper to make.'1
Less than 20 years later, still another decision involving a
sailor suing to enforce a promise of increased wages reached the
courts. In Stilk v. Myrick,"2 Lord Ellenborough with equal clarity
shifted the basis of denial of the claim from policy to contract by
saying:
I think Harris v. Watson . . .was rightly decided; but I doubt
whether the ground of public policy, upon which Lord Kenyon is
stated to have proceeded, be the true principle on which the decision
is to be supported. Here, I say, the agreement is void for want of
consideration. There was no consideration for the ulterior pay prom-
ised to the mariners who remained with the ship.
3
Thus, while the performance of official duties being barred
as consideration for the private promise to pay for them is clearly
a matter of policy, there is some justification for an attempt to
rationalize the rule through contract theory. Today the principle
is so thoroughly established without the aid of contract theory
that any analysis based on contract law is superfluous. The signif-
icant point is that contract doctrine is one means of implement-
ing social policy. That the social policy has shifted or that it has
been achieved by legislation rather than judicial decision does not
alter the fundamental fact that contract doctrine can serve to
accomplish goals and achieve goods not directly related to the
commercial concept of contract.
Also excluded from this analysis is the rule that payment of
a lesser amount cannot discharge a duty to pay a greater amount.
This rule, which is known as the Doctrine of Foakes v. Beer" or
the Rule in Pinnel's Case,'5 has itself been the subject of much
controversy. Because the doctrine has within it a series of incon-
sistencies and errors and was so contrary to the thinking of even
1 Id. This policy decision dealing with sailor's wages may be the basis for distinguish-
ing the New York cases, Bartlett v. Wyman, 14 Johns. 260 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1817) (a sailor)
and Lattimore v. Harsen, 14 Johns. 330 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1817) (which did not involve a
seaman). However, there is not the slightest hint in either New York opinion that the court
considered maritime policy.
12 170 Eng. Rep. 1168 (C.P. 1809).
,1 Id. at 1169.
14 Foakes v. Beer, 9 App. Cas. 605 (1884).
1 Pinnel's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 237 (C.P. 1602).
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the justices who articulated it in Foakes v. Beer,'" it cannot be
productively analyzed from a contract point of view. Rather, any
attempted analysis of it becomes enmeshed in the internal diffi-
culties of the rule itself.
The first problem with the rule that payment of a lesser
amount is not discharge of a debt of a greater amount is that it
is not truly a contract rule.'7 Pinnel's Case,'8 upon which the court
in Foakes relied, was an action in debt. Debt grew out of detinue,
a property writ, and required that the plaintiff seek to recover a
sum certain. There was no element of consideration, nor even a
concept akin to it, required in debt. Foakes was an action in
assumpsit (contract) and, therefore, Pinnel was a most inappro-
priate and confusing precedent. The problem is that although the
rule makes sense as a property rule, it is ludicrous as a contract
rule.
An even greater error in Foakes' reliance on Pinnel is that
Pinnel was decided on the pleadings. Therefore, Pinnel's discus-
sion of consideration is clearly obiter dictum.
Further, Foakes placed great reliance on the fact that Lord
Coke was a reporter of Pinnel. Yet later, when Coke became a
judge, he drew with the greatest precision the line between satis-
faction of a debt and consideration in contract when he said:
[Allso if a man be bound to another by a bill in [L1000] and he
pay unto him [L500] in discharge of this bill, the which he accepts
of accordingly, and doth upon this assume and promise to deliver
up unto him his said bill of [L1000] this [L500] is no satisfaction
of the [£1000] but yet this is good and sufficient to make a good
promise, and upon a good consideration, because he hath paid
mony, (s) five hundred pounds, and he hath -no remedy for this
again."
However, the gravest problem with the Doctrine of Foakes v.
Beer is its incompatibility with modern business practices. The
opinion of the House of Lords which created the doctrine demon-
strates this problem. The opinion voices the doubts of the Jus-
tices as to the commercial wisdom of the rule, but such doubts
fell victim to precedent and Lord Coke's fame. This incompatibil-
* 9 App. Cas. at 622. There were four separate opinions in the case.
,* See Ames, Two Theories of Consideration, 12 HARV. L. REV. 515 (1889); Ferson, The
Rule in Foakes v. Beer, 31 YALE L.J. 15 (1921); Gold, The Present Status of the Rule in
Pinnel's Case I, 30 Ky. L.J. 72, and II, 30 Ky. L.J. 187 (1941).
IS 77 Eng. Rep. 237 (C.P. 1602).
Bagge v. Slade, 81 Eng. Rep. 137 (K.B. 1614) (emphasis added).
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ity with the then current commercial practice subjected the doc-
trine to early ridicule " and eventual oblivion, by way of either
direct legislation or judicial exception or overruling.2'
Refusal22 or failure 3 to distinguish the duty to pay a sum
certain from strictly executory contractual duties has obscured
the pre-existing duty rule and prevented full understanding of the
criteria for modification of executory contracts. Cases coming
within the Doctrine of Foakes are, in accurate analysis, outside
the doctrine of consideration. Therefore, in order to achieve both
of the goals of this paper-an understanding of the pre-existing
duty rule and a demarcation of the criteria for modifica-
tion-such cases will not be considered.
II. TRADITIONAL THEORY OF CONSIDERATION
In the analysis of this problem it will be useful to set forth
E.g., Clayton v. Clark, 74 Miss. 499, 21 So. 565 (1897). The court stated:
The absurdity and unreasonableness of the rule seem to be generally con-
ceded, but there also seems to remain a wavering, shadowy belief in the fact,
falsely so called, that the agreement to accept and the actual acceptance of
a lesser sum in full satisfaction of a larger sum is without any consideration
to support it; that is, that the new agreement confers no benefit upon the
creditor. However it may have seemed 300 years ago in England, when trade
and commerce had not yet burst their swaddling bands, at this day, and in
this country, where almost every man is in some way or other engaged in
trade or commerce, it is as ridiculous as it is untrue to say that the payment
of a lesser part of an originally greater debt, cash in hand, without vexation,
costs, and delay, or the hazards of litigation in an effort to collect all, is not
often-nay, generally-greatly to the benefit of the creditor. Why shall not
money-the thing sought to be secured by new notes of third parties, notes
whose payment in money is designed to be secured by mortgage, and even
negotiable notes of the debtor himself-why shall not the actual payment of
money, cash in hand, be held to be as good consideration for a new agree-
ment, as beneficial to the creditor, as any mere promises to pay the same
amount, by whomsoever made and whomsoever secured? . . . And a rule of
law which declares that under no circumstances, however favorable and
beneficial to the creditor, or however hard and full of sacrifice to the debtor,
can the payment of a less sum of money at the time and place stipulated in
the original obligation or afterwards, for a greater sum, though accepted by
the creditor in full satisfaction of the whole debt, ever amount in law to
satisfaction of the original debt, is absurd, irrational, unsupported by reason,
and not founded in authority, as has been declared by courts of the highest
respectability and of last resort, even when yielding reluctant assent to it.
Id. at 509-10, 21 So. at 569.
21 Gold, supra note 17, at 187.
E.g., 1A CoRBIN § 174 recognizes the distinction but does not choose to pursue it.
2 Coffee & McKeithan, The Requirement of Consideration for the Discharge of Con-
tractual Obligations in Texas, 33 TEx. L. Rav. 225 (1954); see Hudson, Doctrine of Consid-
eration in Iowa Revisited-the Bargain Element, 5 DRAKE L. REV. 67, 68-70 (1956); Com-




briefly the traditional consideration theory justifying the pre-
existing duty rule because many, if not most, of the cases evading
the rule are set in the terms of the traditional doctrine. Typically,
the insufficiency of a pre-existing duty as consideration has been
explained through the detriment/benefit test of consideration. 4 A
concise contemporary articulation of this particular application
of the detriment/benefit test is:
On principle, the second agreement is invalid for the perform-
ance by the recalcitrant contractor or is no legal detriment to him
whether actually given or promised, since, at the time the second
agreement was entered into, he was already bound to do the work;
nor is the performance under the second agreement a legal benefit
to the promisor since he was already entitled to have the work
done .2
To date, analyses of cases dealing with the pre-existing duty rule
have focused on the reasoning of the detriment/benefit test. This
paper will go beyond consideration of the detriment/benefit test
in order to uncover the principles which underlie the test as ap-
plied to pre-existing duty cases. First, however, it will be advan-
tageous to view the traditional doctrine in action.
III. TRADITIONAL THEORY AS APPLIED
A. Performance of a Pre-Existing Duty Not Consideration
Because of the unique connection of the law of contracts with
the commercial development of the English-speaking nations, the
most accurate insight into any particular rule is through its appli-
cation to commercial transactions. This section will include a
survey of cases where the pre-existing duty rule has been ap-
plied-in situations involving bailments, construction contracts,
installment loan contracts, leases, and brokerage contracts. In
these cases the implications of the pre-existing duty rule to com-
mercial policy are apparent, and little comment is necessary.
Following the survey of the application of the rule, several cases
will be analyzed in depth in an attempt to disclose the true basis
of the rule.
1. Bailments
In De Cecchis v. Evers26 the pre-existing duty rule was ap-
24 See CALAMARI & PERtLuo § 61; 1A CORBIN § 172; 1 S. WILLISTON, CONTRAcTs § 130
(3d ed. 1957) [hereinafter cited as WILLISTON]; Corbin, Does a Pre-Existing Duty Defeat
Consideration?, 27 YALE L.J. 362 (1918); Williston, supra note 1.
1 WILLISTON § 130, at 532.
54 Del. 99, 174 A.2d 463 (Super. Ct. 1961).
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plied in a bailment situation. The plaintiff telephoned the defen-
dant, a warehouseman, and inquired about the storage of furni-
ture, rugs, and appliances. The plaintiff was informed about rates
and packing requirements, but at no time was she told of any
limits on the liability of the storage company. Plaintiff agreed to
the terms and instructed the defendant to pick up the goods,
which was quickly accomplished. A few days later the plaintiff
received warehouse receipts through the mail. Three and a half
years later, the plaintiff requested the goods and they were deliv-
ered; but before the defendant would release them, he demanded
that the plaintiff sign the receipts that had been mailed to her.
The receipt had printed upon it a clause limiting the defendant's
liability for damage to $50.00 per package. In the suit by the
plaintiff to recover for physical damage to the goods, the defen-
dant sought to invoke the limitation. The court ruled in favor of
the plaintiff and refused to limit liability. The basis for the re-
fusal was that a contract had been made orally and the limitation
of liability did not arise until days after, when the receipts were
first delivered to the plaintiff. As such, the limitation was viewed
as a modification of the original contract. The court found that
there was no consent to, nor consideration for, the modification.
2. Construction Contracts
Tri-City Concrete Co. v. A. L. A. Construction Co., 7 a con-
struction contract case, is an excellent example of the conceptual
identity of the modification problem and the pre-existing duty
rule. Tri-City, the plaintiff, orally agreed to supply concrete as
ordered by A.L.A., the defendant, and to deliver the concrete to
the job site. Further, the oral agreement provided that each deliv-
ery was to be accompanied by a sales memorandum, to be signed
by A.L.A.'s agent.18 One clause of the memorandum provided
that the buyer was to be liable for any damage to the seller's truck
which occurred while the truck was on the job site. During one
such delivery, the truck tipped over and fell into an excavation
on the job site. The seller sued to recover for the damage. The
court denied recovery on the basis that the sales memorandum
could not serve as a modification of the original agreement (which
" 343 Mass. 425, 179 N.E.2d 319 (1962).
2 There was a question whether the employee signing the memorandum involved in
the litigation was in fact authorized to do so, and the court considered agency rationale.
However, the court disposed of the case on contract grounds.
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contained no such provision as to damage to equipment) because
such modifications must be supported by consideration.
Mainland v. Alfred Brown Co.,9 involving the subcontract-
ing of electrical work, also demonstrates the operation of the rule.
The subcontractor agreed to supply materials and labor to the
contractor at the construction site. This agreement was silent as
to who bore the risk of loss on goods delivered to, but not installed
at, the site. Fire destroyed goods stored on the site. The subcon-
tractor alleged a subsequent promise by the general contractor to
reimburse the subcontractor for the loss if the subcontractor
would finish the job. The subcontractor's suit on the promise to
pay for the loss was unsuccessful because the court found that he
bore the risk of loss unless there was a specific agreement to the
contrary. The court further found that the oral promise to reim-
burse could not serve as such an agreement to shift the risk of loss
because
[t]he oral assurance of reimbursement for that loss given by
the contractor did not constitute an enforceable promise. The sub-
contractor was obligated to complete his contract notwithstanding
such assurance. Consequently, that assurance, or promise, was given
without consideration. 0
The issue of the pre-existing duty rule most frequently ap-
pears in construction contracts in regard to determining the right
to receive payment for "extras."'"
3. Installment Contracts
The pre-existing duty rule has also been used to further the
law's policy of encouraging the extension of credit by protecting
lenders, especially purchase-money lenders. In In re Dahn31 a
husband and wife had become jointly liable on a conditional sales
agreement for the purchase price of a mobile home. After the
husband's death the wife attempted to have his estate pay the
balance of the contract. To implement this plan, she refused to
make any payments and turned the mobile home over to the
lender. After a period of time the lender sold the home and filed
suit for the deficiency. The wife counterclaimed for damages,
claiming the lender had promised to hold the home until her
" 85 Nev. 654, 461 P.2d 862 (1969).
Id. at 656, 461 P.2d at 864.
3, Watson Lumber Co. v. Guennewig, 79 Ill. App. 2d 377, 226 N.E.2d 270 (1967); see
Britton v. Gabriel, 2 N.C. App. 213, 162 S.E.2d 686 (1968).
32 204 Kan. 535, 464 P.2d 238 (1970).
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claim against the estate had been determined. The court found
for the lender on the ground that there was no consideration for
the lender's promise. There was no consideration because the wife
was obligated under the conditional sales agreement to deliver
the home to the lender when in arrears. Therefore, the fulfillment
of the conditional sales contract duty could not be consideration
for the lender's promise to hold the home pending the outcome
of the claim against the estate.
A similar result was achieved in Walden v. Backus.3 3 There,
the plaintiff had sold a motel to the defendant on an installment
contract. The defendant took possession and began making pay-
ments. After the defendant missed a payment, the plaintiff urged
him to keep the motel and continue payment. Finally, the defen-
dant surrendered the premises and left the keys with the plaintiff.
The plaintiff resold the motel for a lower price and sued the
defendant for the balance. The defendant contended that the
surrender of the premises had been consideration for the plain-
tiff's promise to release the defendant. The court found that there
was no consideration for the alleged promise of release because
the defendant was obligated under the original installment con-
tract to return the keys and surrender the premises to the plaintiff
in the event of default. Therefore, the surrender could not have
been consideration for the release.
The pre-existing duty rule has similarly been invoked to pro-
tect account creditors. 4
4. Leases
The pre-existing duty rule has also been used in lease situa-
tions to protect landlords. In Green v. Millman Brothers Inc.3" an
agreement by the landlord to accept a lower rent was held ineffec-
tive on the basis of the rule. After the lessee had rented and
occupied space in a shopping center, its business was not what
had been anticipated. The lessor therefore agreed to a reduction
in rent of $150.00 per month. After 1 year at the reduced rental
the lessor sued to recover the original higher rental except for the
1-year period. The Michigan court held that the lessor could re-
cover because there was no consideration for the promise of the
3 81 Nev. 634, 408 P.2d 712 (1965).
m See International Shoe Co. v. Carmichael, 114 So. 2d 436 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959);
O'Brien v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 362 P.2d 455 (Wyo. 1961).




reduced rental in that the lessee-defendant did only what was
required of it by the original lease-pay rent.
In a classic application, the rule was invoked in Little v.
Reddit3 to void an option to renew a lease. The plaintiff's assig-
nor had rented the premises to the defendant. Twenty-five
months after the commencement of the lease, the plaintiff's assig-
nor, in further consideration of the rent, had granted to the defen-
dant the right to renew for a period of 1 to 10 years after the
original 10-year term. The court declared the option void because
it was a modification of the original lease; as such, it required
consideration. The obligation to pay rent was held not to be con-
sideration for the option because the obligation to pay had been
created by the original lease.
5. Brokerage Contracts
In Block v. Drucker37 the rule was applied to a brokerage
contract. The fact pattern hints at an underlying reason for the
apparently conflicting applications of the pre-existing duty rule.
The plaintiff was retained to find a buyer for the defendant's
house at a set figure. The plaintiff produced a buyer at a lower
price, and the defendant agreed to sell at this lower figure. The
defendant then insisted that the plaintiff accept a lower commis-
sion than had been provided for in their original agreement, and
the plaintiff acceded. The defendant subsequently sold the house
to another buyer at a higher figure.
The plaintiff sued for, and recovered, the higher commission.
The defendant argued on appeal that the verdict for the commis-
sion at the higher figure could not be upheld because of the subse-
quent agreement by the plaintiff to accept a lower commission.
The court rejected this argument, finding that, "This agreement
was not an effective novation [sic] (modification) of the original
agreement since it was not supported by consideration. ' 3 To as-
sess this holding, it is necessary to recognize the plaintiff's plight
when the promise to accept a lower commission was extracted
from him. He had worked to find a buyer, and unless he agreed
to the lower commission, the fruits of his labor would have been
denied him.
" 264 Ala. 371, 88 So. 2d 354 (1956). See also Goldsbrough v. Gable, 140 Ill. 269, 29
N.E. 722 (1892).
212 So. 2d 890 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
" Id. at 891.
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B. Cases Revealing the True Operation and Application of the
Rule
The rationale underlying the application of the pre-existing
duty rule, and thus explaining the apparent contradictions in its
application, is candidly articulated in the case of Lingenfelder v.
Wainwright Brewing Co.39 That case involved a contract for the
construction of a brewery. The architect employed to do the work
also had an interest in a refrigeration manufacturing concern.
When the architect learned that the brewer had ordered refrigera-
tion equipment from a competitor of the architect's firm, he re-
fused to continue with the construction of the brewery. In his
pique, the architect, "took away his plans, called off his superin-
tendent on the ground, and notified Mr. Wainwright that he
would have nothing more to do with the brewery."4 ° Mr. Wain-
wright, the owner of the brewery, wanted the brewery completed
as soon as possible. Stymied and pressured by the work stoppage,
Wainwright agreed to pay the architect 5 percent on the cost of
the competing refrigeration equipment if the architect would re-
sume construction. The architect completed the work but Wain-
wright refused to pay the 5 percent. This suit, by the architect's
executors, ensued.
The court held against the architect, denying his claim to the
5 percent on the refrigeration equipment. In its opinion the court
addressed itself to the two issues of major concern to this analysis.
The first point was the allegation by the plaintiff that the original
contract had been abrogated and a new one (i.e., a modification)
requiring the 5 percent premium, had replaced the original. The
court, on the basis of the facts, rejected this argument, stating,
"I find in the evidence no substitution of one contract for an-
other."4
The court then turned its attention to whether there was
"any consideration for the promise of Wainwright to pay Jungen-
feld [the deceased architect] 5 per cent. on the refrigerator
plant."42 Not surprisingly, the court found that there was no con-
sideration because the architect had done only what he had been
already obligated to do by the first contract. Therefore, the law
regarded the second contract as a nudum pactum.
103 Mo. 578, 15 S.W. 844 (1891).
Id. at 585, 15 S.W. at 846.
41 Id. at 586, 15 S.W. at 846.
12 Id. at 592, 15 S.W. at 847.
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The holding and analysis of Lingenfelder are similar to many
such cases reaching the same result. The candor of Justice Gantt
in explaining the holding, however, sets his opinion apart. He
discloses what moved the court to invoke the pre-existing duty
rule against the architect:
No amount of metaphysical reasoning can change the plain fact that
Jungenfeld took advantage of Wainwright's necessities, and
extorted the promise of 5 per cent. on the refrigerator plant as the
condition of his complying with his contract already entered into.
Nor was there even the flimsy pretext that Wainwright had violated
any of the conditions of the contract on his part ...
To permit plaintiff to recover under such circumstances would be
to offer a premium on bad faith, and to invite men to violate their
most sacred contracts that they may profit by their own wrong.
3
Further evidence that the court was motivated by fear of
extortion or abusive dealing is in Justice Gantt's statement:
"[Alnd [the law] will not lend its process to aid in the wrong."44
Relying on the insight provided by Justice Gantt's opinion,
it is the primary contention of this paper that the key to the
enigmatic nature of the pre-existing duty rule is a fear of misdeal-
ing. If a court suspects that the second contract-the modifica-
tion-was extorted or otherwise unfairly extracted from the
promisor, it will employ the pre-existing duty rule to deny en-
forcement of the second contract. On the other hand, if the court
does not suspect abusive dealing, it will enforce the second con-
tract by ignoring the consideration issue,45 by finding an excep-
tion to the pre-existing duty rule, or by devising a mechanical
route around it.
Numerous cases, old and new, support the theory that a
desire to prohibit misdealing is the key to the understanding of
Id. at 592-93, 15 S.W. at 848 (emphasis added). But see Austin Instrument Inc. v.
Loral Corp., 29 N.Y.2d 124, 272 N.E.2d 533, 324 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1971), where instead of
asserting the pre-existing duty rule to defend against the coercing contractor's suit for the
extra money, the aggrieved, coerced party paid the money and sued for damages on the
theory of duress to force repayment of the sum wrongfully extracted from him.
103 Mo. at 595, 15 S.W. at 848.
See Savage Arms Corp. v. United States, 266 U.S. 217 (1924). The Court decided
that a review of the issue of consideration for modification of a government contract was
unnecessary; it upheld the modification and found in favor of the government:
Whether the agreement was made reluctantly, or appellant got the worst of
the bargain, are matters unnecessary to be considered. It is enough that,
without fraud or coercion, it did agree.
Id. at 221. Corbin recognizes the potential of such an analysis, but does not develop it.
1A CoRBIN § 183.
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the pre-existing duty rule. Although no opinion quite matches
Lingenfelder's candor in announcing this concern as the key to
the rule, examination of a few cases applying the rule will support
this theory.
Alaska Packers' Association v. Domenico," a case with facts
similar to those of Lingenfelder, quotes the passage about extor-
tion from that case. Men who had signed in San Francisco to work
the Alaskan salmon fishing season demanded and got a promise
of higher wages after their arrival in Pyramid Harbor. The court
denied enforcement of the promise of higher wages on the ground
of lack of consideration because of the pre-existing contractual
duty to provide these same services. The coextensive import of
Alaska Packers' and Lingenfelder is best demonstrated by the
facts seized upon by the court to support its holding:
The evidence showed, and the court below found that it was impos-
sible for the appelant to get other men to take the places of the
libelants, the place being remote, the season short and just opening;
so that, after endeavoring for several days without success to induce
the libelants to proceed with their work in accordance with their
contracts, the company's superintendent . . .yielded to their
demands .... 1
It is clear that the court in Alaska Packers' was concerned with
economic extortion and misdealing, just as Justice Gantt was in
his condemnation of the architect.
In King Construction Co. v. W. M. Smith Electric Co.,4" the
concepts of economic coercion and the pre-existing duty rule are
neatly juxtaposed. King, a bidder on an Atomic Energy Commis-
sion contract, obtained an offer from Smith for the construction
of a crane required by the AEC. Smith bid $16,691, and King used
that figure in its bid to the AEC. King was awarded the contract
and was instructed to commence work immediately. The AEC
contract made time of the essence, and penalty provisions were
included. The day after the award, King entered into an oral
contract with Smith for the crane at $16,691. Less than a week
later, Smith informed King that it would not deliver the crane at
the agreed price. For about a month King attempted to find
another crane, but, as it turned out, Smith was the only practical
source. Therefore, King entered into a written contract with
41117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902).
Id. at 101 (emphasis added).
" 350 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
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Smith for a crane; but the price was $30,750, instead of the prior
lower price.
Smith sued King for the balance on the contract as modified.
King counterclaimed for payments made in excess of the price set
by the original contract. The majority of the court held for King
on both claims finding that the modification49 was not fully
agreed to by King. The court held that King had signed the
second agreement under duress and therefore was not bound by
it. The court equated economic coercion with duress.
The concurring opinion, on the other hand, chose as the cen-
tral issue the lack of consideration for the second promise. King
raised as one of its points on appeal:
[Tihe parties having entered into a valid oral contract ... for the
sale and purchase of the crane specified for $16,691.00, there was no
consideration for the later written agreement for ... the sum of
$30,750.00 for the crane.
50
Seizing on this, the concurring opinion denied the validity of
the modification, not on the basis of duress, but on the basis that
there was "no real or true consideration for the making of the new
contract."
5'
Here again the almost identical natures of the pre-existing
duty rule and the right to modify an executory bilateral contract
can be seen. The majority opinion made clear that the right to
modify a contract is limited by the extent to which the modifica-
tion is arrived at freely. The concurring opinion reflected the
same thinking, but chose to express it through the pre-existing
duty rule and the absence of consideration.
Another recent case offering insight into the relationship of
the pre-existing duty rule and modification demonstrates the
same concern with abusive business practices as do the other
cases where the rule is invoked. Nicholas v. Harger-Haldeman
52
dealt with the purchase of an automobile "on time" in Southern
11 The Texas court refers to the second agreement as a "novation," that is, substitut-
ing one obligation for another. Id. at 943. That statement is no doubt correct under Texas
law. For consistency with UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-209 and for clarity, however, this
paper treats such an agreement as a modification, restricting the term novation to the
meaning given in RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRcrs § 424 (1932), that is, a modification involv-
ing a new party as well as a new obligation.
350 S.W.2d at 945.
" Id. at 947.
52 196 Cal. App. 2d 77, 16 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1961).
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California and involved pervasive misdealing reflective of current
commercial and consumer problems.
Nicholas, the plaintiff-buyer, was not an American by birth
and had difficulty with the English language. He went to
defendant-seller's automobile sales room to purchase a new car.
The salesman "switched" him up to a more expensive model by
offering him a most attractive deal. The deal, which in typical
fashion required manager approval, set the price of the $5,000
model at $4,100. This price was to be paid by a trade-in credit
on Nicholas' old car of $950 plus a cash down payment of $300;
the balance was to be paid in monthly payments, commencing
August 1st, of just over $100.
The necessary managerial approval was given in 6 minutes.
Nicholas and the salesman signed some papers and Nicholas
made a $20 cash deposit and signed over the title to the car he
traded in. It was agreed that Nicholas would bring in the $280
balance of the down payment the next day and pick up his new
car. Nicholas returned as scheduled and made the payment, but
was told that still another day was necessary before delivery of
his new car.
When Nicholas returned the third day to get the car he was
vaguely informed of some difficulties and was told that an addi-
tional $200 was needed on the down payment plus an undisclosed
amount for insurance. The salesman began writing up a new con-
tract for the extra $200 and $139 for insurance. Nicholas said he
would not sign and that the deal was off. The salesman refused,
saying that the deal was closed and Nicholas' old car could not
be returned to him. The salesman then said that the added $200
could be put in the balance to increase the monthly payments.
Papers were presented to Nicholas for his signature. He signed
and was told copies would be mailed to him. He finally got his
new car.
Two weeks later Nicholas received a contract calling for $200
to be paid July 7th. He did not make that payment, but did make
the first payment as scheduled by the original contract. The new
car was repossessed and Nicholas was told that the repossession
was caused by his failure to make the $200 pickup payment which
had been due on July 7th. Nicholas then offered to pay the $200
immediately. The defendant-seller's credit manager refused to
accept the money and advised Nicholas to see the insurance man.
Nicholas saw the insurance man, who advised him to take
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out more insurance. Nicholas refused, returned to the credit-
manager, and demanded his car. The credit manager refused to
return the car unless Nicholas would pay the $200 plus $1,000 for
the repossession service and the balance due. Nicholas declined
and filed suit for the conversion of personal property in the car
and for punitive damages.
In their defense the sellers argued that the second contract
superseded all prior negotiations and that therefore Nicholas'
breach of the second agreement justified the repossession of the
car. Thus, the defense maintained, there could have been no
conversion. The trial court held that there was no breach by
Nicholas and that the second contract was not valid, or if it was,
that the seller-defendant had waived strict compliance with it.
The appellate court affirmed the decision for the buyer. It
grounded its decision on the lack of consideration for the second
agreement because of coercion, stating:
Apparently believing that he was forced to sign a new contract
to save his downpayment and Dodge car, plaintiff signed Exhibit K
[the second contract or modification], the conditional sales con-
tract of June 26. There was no further consideration for the execu-
tion of a new agreement. It was all for the benefit of the defendant.
The basic doctrine generally required by the several states is that a
promise to pay an additional or greater amount than that which the
promisee is already under contractual obligation to the promisor to
pay is without consideration.Y
C. Forms of Misdealing Prevented by the Rule
Alaska Packers, King Construction, and Nicholas clearly
demonstrate the use of the pre-existing duty rule by courts to
avoid sanctioning agreements that have resulted from extortion
or economic coercion. In most of the cases reviewed in the remain-
der of this article, courts have been concerned with the potential
for economic extortion arising from the interdependence of par-
ties to a contract once performance has begun. The rule, however,
has been applied to prevent numerous other forms of misdealing.
In Moehling v. W. E. O'Neil Construction Co.54 the Illi-
nois Supreme Court used the pre-existing duty rule to deny a
disloyal agent the benefits of her double dealing. The plaintiff,
a licensed real estate broker, was retained by the defendant to
acquire land for it. The defendant needed land from which fill
Id. at 88, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 202.
20 Ill. 2d 255, 170 N.E.2d 100 (1960).
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could be taken for use in a road construction project the defen-
dant had undertaken. The plaintiff found land that met the
defendant's needs and began the steps necessary to acquire it for
the company. However, the plaintiff alleged that she then entered
into an oral contract with the defendant whereby the defendant
agreed that the plaintiff could acquire 10 acres of the tract for
herself. These 10 acres were not appropriate for the defendant's
use, but had great commercial value for other uses. The defen-
dant refused to convey the 10 acres to the plaintiff, and she sued
to obtain specific performance of the oral contract.
The court found for the defendant, that there was serious
doubt whether the plaintiff had sufficiently proved the oral con-
tract. The court emphasized that even if the plaintiff had proved
the existence of the oral contract, she could not enforce it because
there was no consideration for the promise to let the plaintiff have
the 10-acre parcel. The plaintiff claimed that the consideration
for the oral promise of the 10 acres was her acquisition of the land
for the defendant. The court invoked the pre-existing duty rule,
stating rather bluntly:
In short, plaintiff performed no act and rendered no service to defen-
dant with respect to the ... land other than what she was already
required and obligated to do by reason of the legal relationship of
principal and agent existing between them.5
The court was most clear in its condemnation of the plain-
tiffs conduct of her agency. It pointed to two particularly treach-
erous acts of the broker. She had negotiated a deal which post-
poned for 2 years the right to remove fill, an arrangement pat-
ently contrary to the defendant's needs. Further, she had not
consulted with her client as to the terms of the option she did
acquire. The court summed up the thinking behind its resort to
the pre-existing duty rule, saying that
[hier failure to do so, as well as her entire course of conduct, leads
us to the conclusion that she abandoned the interests of her princi-
pal and sought only to advance her own."
Another case used the rule against a suspected forgery.57 The
seller and buyer entered into a lease of the seller's stock in a
corporation. However, immediately after executing the instru-
ments requisite for the lease, the seller informed the buyer that
Id. at 266, 170 N.E.2d at 106.
Id. at 268-69, 170 N.E.2d at 108.
Johnson v. Tanner, 59 Wash. 2d 606, 369 P.2d 307 (1962).
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
the terms of the lease violated company policy pertaining to such
agreements. The parties then converted their arrangement to a
sale, with a loan of $3,250 from the seller to the buyer. The buyer
went to work for the company; and, as was the custom in the area,
an amount in keeping with his loan commitment to the seller was
deducted from his earnings and paid to the seller. In this fashion
the buyer fulfilled his obligations.
However, the seller alleged that a subsequent agreement call-
ing for a purchase price of $15,000 had been executed by the
parties. The Supreme Court of Washington stated that there was
evidence that the parties had never discussed such a contract
before it was signed, that there was no witness willing to testify
that he had seen the buyer sign it, that the buyer denied signing
it, that the alleged signature on the $15,000 contract was in a
different form than that which the buyer customarily signed, and
that the handwriting was dissimilar. The trial court had found
that the signature was not that of the buyer. The supreme court
affirmed that finding of fact, but went further in its discussion of
the law.
It held that even if the trial court had found the signature
genuine, it should still have found for the buyer. This result
would have been dictated by the lack of consideration for the
buyer's promise to pay $15,000, since the seller was already obli-
gated to sell the stock to the buyer for $3,250.
In Murphy v. Royal American Industries, Inc.58 the rule was
invoked to thwart an evasion of the Securities Act. The plaintiffs
agreed to exchange some stock for stock in the defendant com-
pany. The defendant agreed that the stock it would give in ex-
change would be registered and freely transferable. Additionally,
the defendant agreed that if it somehow failed to deliver regis-
tered stock, it would repurchase the stock it did deliver to the
plaintiffs at a price of $2.50 per share. Later, it was discovered
that the stock that had been earmarked for transfer to the plain-
tiffs had not been registered and that a registration would have
to be undertaken unless the shares were restricted to investment
purposes. In order to obviate the necessity of a registration and
still be able to complete the original contract, the defendants
placed on the certificates a legend to the effect that the shares
188 So. 2d 884 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966), cert. denied, 201 So. 2d 465, cert. denied,
389 U.S. 953 (1967).
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were for investment purposes, had not been registered, and could
not be transferred unless registered. Further, at the closing the
plaintiffs signed an investment letter which also acknowledged
that they took the shares for investment purposes and had no
intention of selling them.
Subsequently, the plaintiffs made a demand on the defen-
dant to repurchase the shares at $2.50 per share as required by
their agreement. The defendant refused, and the plaintiff sued to
enforce the agreement. The defendant alleged that the invest-
ment letter and the legend on the stock had modified the original
agreement, thereby waiving the registration provision. The court
found for the plaintiffs, saying that the plaintiffs' recital of the
intention not to dispose of the stock was executed at the request
of the defendants in an effort to avoid violation of the federal law.
The court then turned to the question of the pre-existing duty
rule:
Such receipt [of the investment letter] did not constitute a modifi-
cation of the contract in that there was no consideration for a change
or modification .... An estoppel did not arise in that by signing
the investment letter plaintiffs received no benefit but merely ac-
knowledged a known fact that they might not be able to sell their
stock until registered, and such action by the plaintiffs was not to
the detriment of the defendants. . . . The same did not constitute
a waiver of the provisions of the contract in that there was no show-
ing of the intentional relinquishment of a known right."
Although the court clearly was concerned with the efficacy of the
modification, its concern with the protection afforded by the Se-
curities Act is equally clear. The court permitted completion of
the sale of the unregistered stock, but did not permit the de-
fendants to bypass the alternative protection the plaintiffs had
obtained.
The pre-existing duty rule has also been used to monitor the
work of fiduciaries. In Carpenter v. Taylor ° the rule was used to
prevent an assignee for the benefit of creditors from taking advan-
tage of his position. The plaintiff, as assignee for the benefit of
creditors, after inventorying the assets of the debtor felt a surplus
could be had. Therefore, he entered into an agreement with the
debtor-assignor whereby the debtor would pay him (the assignee)
a commission on any surplus realized, in recognition of his astute
0 Id. at 886-87.
0 164 N.Y. 171, 58 N.E. 52 (1900).
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
management. A surplus was achieved, but the debtor would not
pay the commission, and the assignee sued. The court found for
the debtor on the theory that the assignment for benefit of credi-
tors had obligated the assignee to manage to the best of his abil-
ity. Therefore, his promise to do so in return for a commission
could not be consideration for the promise to pay a commission
because it was a promise to perform a pre-existing duty.
The pre-existing duty rule has also been used to frustrate
attempts to make a testamentary disposition without conforming
to the wills act and simultaneously to prevent the circumvention
of community property law. In In re Bray's Estate6 the testator
hired his son by a former marriage to work for him. After the son
had been employed in the testator's business for 6 years, the
testator began taking funds from the business and depositing
them in a joint account with the son. The son knew of the exist-
ence of the joint account, but knew nothing about the amounts
deposited. After the testator's death his widow claimed half of the
joint account as community property. The son alleged it was
salary. The court expressed its concern about the testator's se-
crecy, the invasion of community property, and the attempted
evasion of the Statute of Wills. It ruled in favor of the widow on
the ground that the son had already been bound to work under
his employment contract, and that therefore there was no consid-
eration for the joint bank account.
A similar theory was employed in In re Creal2 to deny efficacy
to an alleged waiver of the debt owing from a son to the testator.
The pre-existing duty rule has also been used in situations
where the integrity of government officials might be in question.
It has certainly been used to maintain the integrity of competitive
bidding for government work. In Board of Education v. Barracks"
a taxpayer filed suit to enjoin payment by the board of education
to a contractor who had built a school and who sought payment
of an extra $24,500 pursuant to an oral modification agreed to by
the board. The facts were that the contractor was the low bidder
and was awarded the contract. He supplied a performance bond.
After work began the contractor said costs had risen because of
World War I and that he could not complete the work unless he
61 230 Cal. App. 2d 136, 40 Cal. Rptr. 750 (1964).
62 27 N.Y.2d 339, 266 N.E.2d 815, 318 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1971).
235 Ill. App. 35 (1924). See also, Gragg v. James, 452 P.2d 579 (Okla. 1969);
Montgomery v. City of Philadelphia, 391 Pa. 607, 139 A.2d 347 (1958).
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was paid an extra $33,500. There was an unofficial meeting of the
school board, attended by a majority of the members (including
the president and secretary), the architect, and the contractor. At
this unofficial meeting it was agreed that the contractor should
continue construction and that the board would protect him from
loss on the contract. Later, at a regular meeting of the board, the
contractor's extra compensation was limited to $24,500 because
that figure would raise the contractor's remuneration to what the
next lowest bid had been.
The court granted the injunction enjoining the extra pay-
ment to the contractor. The pre-existing duty rule was the basis
of the decision. A major factor in the court's reasoning was that
the contractor had supplied a bond; therefore, if the contractor
had in fact refused to complete the school, the board could have
had the work done by someone else and charged any increased
costs to the bondsman." The court also specially noted that there
had been other bidders who could have been called on if the
contractor had abandoned the work. The court dwelt at length on
the questionable nature of the informal board meeting at which
the modification had been made. It pointed out that state law
required a recording of votes on expenditures and that there had
been none. Further, state law required all business of the board
to be conducted at regular or special meetings, with minutes
kept. This meeting was neither a regular nor a special meeting;
and although the secretary was present, no minutes were taken.
The court's feelings about the informal meeting at which the
alleged modification was made are best summed up in its own
words:
The board later did not pretend to settle on this basis [the agree-
ment to pay his extra costs] but allowed Schwartz [the contractor]
the amount of the second lowest bid, and the substance of all the
testimony is, that some members favored meeting Schwartz's loss
and others did not favor such a plan, but that it all occurred by
individual suggestions from members of the board and no vote was
taken. Informal and uncertain action of this kind by various mem-
bers of the Board of Education cannot be the basis of official action
under which the school district is to be burdened with an indebted-
ness of $24,500, and in the opinion of this court, the district by such
action never assumed any legal liability.u
Because of the bond the court refused to apply the changed circumstances excep-
tion. See text accompanying notes 66-94 infra. It felt that one of the purposes of the bond
was to hedge against just such an occurrence; i.e., the contractor, through its bondsman,
assumed the risk of change.
Id. at 48-49 (1924).
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From these cases it is clear that the pre-existing duty rule is
an example of the employment of a rule of law to implement a
social or economic policy independent from contract law. Courts
look at the facts surrounding the making of the second promise.
If there is evidence of economic extortion or misdealing, courts
apply the pre-existing duty rule and deny enforcement to the
second contract. In cases where courts are satisfied that there is
no misdealing, they do not apply the rule.
The subject of the remainder of this investigation is the var-
ious legal techniques used to escape the pre-existing duty rule. In
a case where the second promise results from a change in circum-
stances, courts frequently apply what will here be called the
changed or unforeseen circumstances exception to the pre-
existing duty rule. In some cases courts avoid the rule entirely
rather than find an exception to it. They may so avoid the rule
by finding that a party has in fact performed a different duty, not
a pre-existing duty. Or a court may avoid the rule by finding that
the original contract was mutually rescinded and a new contract
formed. Another means of escaping the internal technicalities of
the rule and its exception is to enforce the modification on a
theory that one party has relied on the modification to his detri-
ment. And in some cases courts may completely avoid any prob-
lem with the rule by simply holding that no consideration is re-
quired to support a second promise.
IV. THE CHANGED OR UNFORESEEN CIRCUMSTANCES EXCEPTION TO
THE RULE
The changed or unforeseen circumstances exception to the
pre-existing duty rule is applicable when unforeseen or extreme
changes in circumstances occur between the formation and the
performance of a contract. Courts refrain from applying the pre-
existing duty rule because the changed circumstances demon-
strate that the second contract was based on fair rather than
abusive dealing. The legal analysis for the exception is this: the
changed circumstances subject the pre-existing duty to doubt or
to an honest and reasonable dispute; or they create an honest and
reasonable belief in one party that he is discharged from his duty
by the defense of impossibility. The settlement of the dispute or
the giving up of the defense of impossibility is consideration for
the altered promise.
This exception to the pre-existing duty rule typically appears
in construction contracts. It is often held that if changed or un-
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foreseen circumstances arise during the construction of a build-
ing, which make completion of the structure substantially more
difficult than the parties had originally thought, an agreement to
pay the contractor a greater price for his efforts is enforceable.6
Linz v. Schuck7 is a classic example of the operation of the
exception. The plaintiff, a contractor, agreed to dig a cellar under
the defendant's house for $1,500. After work began, it was discov-
ered that the house stood on a hard crust of earth approximately
3 feet thick. However, beneath the crust was a quagmire of soft
wet mud to such a depth that it was impossible to put in the cellar
as contemplated. The contractor stopped work, but the owner of
the house still desired a cellar and kept after the contractor to see
if anything could be done. Finally, the contractor agreed to con-
struct a small cellar by extensive draining and the use of concrete
and cement footings if the owner would pay or reimburse the
additional costs involved.
The court enforced the contractor's right to receive payment
under the subsequent agreement, saying,
When two parties make a contract, based on supposed facts which
they afterwards ascertain to be incorrect, and which would not have
been entered into by the one party if he had known the actual
conditions which the contract required him to meet, not only courts
of justice but all right thinking people must believe the fair course
for the other party to the contract to pursue is either to relieve the
contractor of going on with his contract or to pay him additional
compensation. If the difficulties be unforeseen, and such as neither
party contemplated, or could have from the appearance of the thing
to be dealt with anticipated, it would be an extremely harsh rule of
law to hold that there was no legal way of binding the owner of
property to fulfill a promise made by him to pay the contractor such
additional sum as such unforeseen difficulties cost him."
The opinion lacks precision in the technical points of con-
tract because it relied solely on the moral and ethical reasons to
enforce the subsequent promise to pay more. However, Linz re-
lied heavily on King v. Duluth, Missabe & Northern Railway,69
in which the Minnesota Supreme Court, in its own syllabus of its
opinion, made very clear that the changed or unforeseen circum-
" 1A CoRBiN § 184; 1 WIUISTON § 130; Annot., 138 A.L.R. 136, 138 (1942); Annot.,
55 A.L.R. 1333 (1928); Annot., 25 A.L.R. 1450, 1459 (1923).
- 106 Md. 220, 67 A. 286 (1907).
Id. at 230, 67 A. at 288.
11 61 Minn. 482, 63 N.W. 1105 (1895).
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stances in that case related directly to the consideration question,
and specifically to the pre-existing duty rule:
Held that, where one party to a contract refuses to perform it unless
promised some further pay or benefit than the contract provides,
and the promise is made . . . the promise is without consideration,
unless the refusal was induced by substantial and unforeseen diffi-
culties in the performance, which would cast upon the party addi-
tional burdens not anticipated by the parties when the contract was
made.70
A. The Rationale of the Exception
Not only does King make clear why changed or unforeseen
circumstances trigger an exception to the pre-existing duty rule,
but it also clarifies the relationship of the pre-existing duty rule
and the fear of extortion. While King articulates the changed or
unforeseen circumstances exception to the pre-existing duty rule,
the court held that King's difficulty did not come within the
exception.
King was a contractor who entered into a contract with the
railway to construct a roadbed through a part of the Missabe
Mountains. The contract was made in January of 1893, and per-
formance began almost immediately. In late February unforeseen
difficulties were encountered which increased the cost of con-
struction by $40,000. Consequently, King notified the railway
that he could not proceed. The railway agreed to modify the
original contract and pay for the added costs so that King would
not be compelled to the work at a loss. On the basis of this subse-
quent promise, King completed the job and filed suit to collect
the added costs. The railway claimed that there was no considera-
tion for the alleged promise to pay extra for the work, relying on
the pre-existing duty rule.
In stating the criteria for the unforeseen circumstances which
would create an exception to the rule, the court explained that
the reason for the exception is that the changed circumstances
dispel any suspicions of misdealing. The court described the cir-
cumstances as follows:
They must be substantial, unforeseen, and not within the contem-
plation of the parties when the contract was made. They need not
be such as would legally justify the party in his refusal to perform
his contract, unless promised extra pay, or to justify a court of equity
in relieving him from the contract; for they are sufficient if they are
70 Id. at 482, 63 N.W. at 1105.
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of such a character as to render the party's demand for extra pay
manifestly fair, so as to rebut all inference that he is seeking to be
relieved from an unsatisfactory contract, or to take advantage of the
necessities of the opposite party to coerce from him a promise for
further compensation. Inadequacy of the contract price which is the
result of an error of judgment, and not of some excusable mistake
of fact, is not sufficient.7'
The court found against King on this point and held the
exception inapplicable because frozen ground in the Missabes in
late February was neither so unusual nor so unforeseeable as to
prevent its being anticipated by the parties.7" Therefore, King
entered into the contract knowing full well the difficulty ahead.
As to the pre-existing duty rule, the court held that King elicited
the second promise only to relieve himself of a losing bargain and
thus did not come within the exception.73
King clearly illustrates the major thesis espoused in this
paper, that courts invoke the pre-existing duty rule rather than
being put in the position of placing an imprimatur of legality on
agreements extorted or coerced from one of the parties. At one
point in the opinion Chief Justice Start stated
where the refusal to perform and the promise to pay extra compensa-
tion are one transaction, and there are no exceptional circumstances
making it equitable that an increased compensation should be de-
manded and paid, no amount of astute reasoning can change the
plain fact that the party who refuses to perform, and thereby coerces
a promise from the other party to the contract to pay him an in-
creased compensation for doing that which he is legally bound to do,
takes an unjustifiable advantage of the necessities of the other
party.7"
Id. at 488, 63 N.W. at 1107 (emphasis added).
7 Id. at 488-89, 63 N.W. at 1107, where the court says:
Do the allegations of fact contained in the plaintiff's [King's] first alleged
cause of action bring his case within the exception? Clearly not; for eliminat-
ing all conclusions, and considering only the facts alleged, there is nothing
to make the case exceptional, other than the general statement that the
season was so extraordinary that in order to do the stipulated work it would
require great and unusual ... expense. ...
The fact that the court was denying King the benefits of the exception might well
have required that the court very clearly state the criteria to come within it in order that
the disappointed litigant fully understands the basis of the denial.
11 However, the court found for King on a separate count, on the ground that the
railway had broken the original contract by changing the proposed line to such an extent
that it caused delay which justified King in refusing to proceed with the work under the
first contract.
7' 61 Minn. at 486, 63 N.W. at 1106.
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The existence of new and unforeseen conditions, explained
Justice Start, rebuts the inference of extortion:
But where the party refusing to complete his contract does so by
reason of some unforeseen and substantial difficulties in the per-
formance of the contract, which were not known or anticipated by
the parties when the contract was entered into, and which cast upon
him an additional burden not contemplated by the parties, and the
opposite party promises him extra pay or benefits if he will complete
his contract, and he so promises, the promise to pay is supported by
a valid consideration. In such a case the natural inference arising
from the transaction, if unmodified by any equitable considerations,
is rebutted . . ..
From this examination of King and its handling of the excep-
tion to the pre-existing duty rule, it is clear that the circumstan-
ces surrounding a denial of obligation under the original contract
will markedly influence the court's suspicions and, thus, its even-
tual determination about abusive dealing. Close scrutiny of the
original contract duty is vital to resolving the seemingly contra-
dictory applications of the pre-existing duty rule and to establish-
ing thereby the boundaries of the right to modify an executory
bilateral contract. This close scrutiny is required to determine the
reasonableness of the refusal to perform the original contract duty
by the party seeking the greater amount under the modification.
The reasonableness of that refusal to fulfill the original duty is a
crucial factor in any determination as to abusive dealing. There-
fore, it is contended that the consideration for the second promise
is not the relevant issue; rather, the pertinent issue is the justifi-
cation for refusing to perform the original duty. The degree of
justification for that refusal dictates the application of the pre-
existing duty rule. In this way, as has been stated, reconciliation
of the contradictory applications of the pre-existing duty rule
demands exploration beyond the superficial questions of contract
theory which surround the second contract. Only thorough assess-
ment of the original contract relation will produce a sufficient
understanding of the second.
B. The Relationship of Restatement 76 and the Changed
Circumstances Exception to the Pre-Existing Duty Rule
The Restatement of Contracts, section 76(a), provides that
a pre-existing duty that is neither doubtful nor subject to honest
and reasonable dispute is not sufficient consideration; and sec-
,1 Id. at 487, 63 N.W. at 1107 (emphasis added).
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tion 76(b) provides that the surrender of an invalid claim by one
who does not have an honest, reasonable belief in its possible
validity is not consideration. These two rules provide a legal
bridge for the changed circumstances exception to the pre-
existing duty rule. The change in circumstances raises doubt as
to the continued obligation to perform a pre-existing duty or cre-
ates an honest and reasonable belief that one party could use the
defense of impossibility. In the language of the Restatement, the
performance of the disputed duty or the surrender of a claim
honestly and reasonably believed to be valid is consideration for
the other party's altered obligation. Therefore, the changed cir-
cumstances exception to the pre-existing duty rule not only ap-
peals to one's sense of justice and fairness, as Linz v. Schuck"
maintained, but also has a firm foundation in legal theory. 7
King v. Duluth, Missabe & Northern Railway,78 the case
which dramatized the reason for the exception, specified that the
changed or unforeseen circumstances which would constitute a
sufficient basis for an exception to the pre-existing duty rule need
not be of the same degree required for actual discharge by impos-
sibility.79 This distinction between the requirements for an excep-
tion to the pre-existing duty rule and for discharge is explained
in an earlier opinion of the same court, Michaud v. McGregor.0
Michaud was a contractor who had contracted to build a
store for McGregor on McGregor's lot in Duluth. While excavat-
ing for the purpose of putting in the foundation, Michaud discov-
ered a large quantity of rocks on the land. The rocks had been
placed on the land by the city at an earlier date and had sunk
into the soft subsoil so that it was impossible to drive the pilings.
Neither party knew of the rocks at the time of entering into the
construction contract. McGregor maintained that removal of the
rocks was covered by the contract, but Michaud denied that as-
76 106 Md. 220, 67 A. 286 (1907). See also Healy v. Brewster, 251 Cal. App. 2d 541,
59 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1967).
" 1 WILLISTON § 130 at 532 recognizes the relationship, but limits it to matters of
interpretation of the original contract.
61 Minn. 482, 63 N.W. 1105 (1895).
Id. at 488, 63 N.W. at 1107, where the court describing the changed circumstances
sufficient to permit an exception to the pre-existing duty rule, said:
They need not be such as would legally justify the party in his refusal to
perform his contract. . . or to justify a court of equity in relieving him from
the contract. ...
61 Minn. 198, 63 N.W. 479 (1895).
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sertion. The parties entered into an oral agreement calling for
McGregor to reimburse Michaud for the actual costs of removal
of the rock. After McGregor's refusal to reimburse, Michaud filed
suit to collect the costs of removing the rock.
McGregor pleaded that there was no consideration for the
promise to reimburse, adverting to the pre-existing contractual
duty to build the store. The court, Chief Justice Start again writ-
ing the opinion, discussed the pre-existing duty rule and abusive
dealing in passing. In this case, the court had applied the excep-
tion discussed in King and went deeper into the underlying legal
rationale. It articulated as the basis for upholding the modifica-
tion the dispute caused by the unforeseen circumstances.
The court reasoned that the discovery of the rock was an
unforeseen circumstance. Each party maintained that the other
was responsible for removal and the contractor refused to proceed
unless reimbursed. This controversy was compromised by the
subsequent oral agreement by McGregor to pay the cost of remov-
ing the rock if Michaud would return to work. The court said:
"These facts disclose a valid consideration to support the con-
tract. A bona fide controversy was settled."81
The changed circumstances necessary to bring a case within
the exception to the pre-existing duty rule need not be such as to
form the basis for discharge; they need only be such as to create
a reasonable and honest belief that the original duty is dis-
charged.
Another case demonstrating that the changed circumstances
exception to the pre-existing duty rule is well grounded in the law
surrounding settlement of disputes is United Steel Co. v. Casey.2
There, Casey contracted to construct furnaces for the steel com-
pany at a set unit price. The agreement provided that any modifi-
cations had to be in writing. Subsequently the parties orally
agreed to a change in computing the cost, so that upon comple-
tion Casey claimed that it was entitled to an extra $100,000. The
court of appeals first disposed of the question of the oral modifica-
tion on the basis of the jury's finding in favor of Casey, 3 and then
moved on to what it deemed the more important issue, United
Steel's claim that there was no consideration for the oral agree-
ment.
" Id. at 202, 63 N.W. at 480-81 (emphasis added).
262 F. 889 (6th Cir. 1920).
13 Id. at 890, 891.
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In its discussion of the consideration question, the court
pointed out that United had delayed the project by failing to
deliver plans, by making at least two changes in location, and by
misjudging the amount of excavation that would be necessary. As
a result of these errors on United's part, Casey was forced to do
the work in the winter when it was far more difficult. The court
found for Casey on the ground that the oral agreement settled
Casey's claims under the written agreement. They said:
In this case there is substantial evidence that the Steel Company
had so delayed, hindered, and embarrassed Casey Company in the
performance of its contract that it would at least have had a bona
fide claim for damages, regardless of the amount that it might have
recovered in a suit based on such a claim.
• . . If the Casey Company, after making this contract, had
brought action for damages occasioned by the delays incident to
change of location and failure of the Steel Company to furnish plans
it would have been met with the answer that any claims for damages
it may have had were waived and compensated by the provisions of
the new contract, regardless of whether it had, in terms, waived such
damages."
Thus, the pre-existing duty rule was overcome by a finding that
the consideration for the second contract-the modification-was
the surrender of a reasonable and honest claim arising out of the
first contract. The court specifically distinguished this case from
Lingenfelder v. Wainwright Brewery Co.85 and similar holdings
which invoke the pre-existing duty rule against modifications by
saying:
In that case Lingenfelder, [sic] (Jungenfeld, the architect) at the
time the oral contract was made to pay him 5 per cent. on the
refrigerator plant as the condition of his complying with his contract
relating to other matters, had no claim for damages whatever
against the owner, nor was there any reasonable excuse for his re-
fusal to perform work covered by that contract according to its
terms."
A similar result was achieved in a case where the dispute
arose as to the contractor's duty to repair or insure his work after
it had been completed but before the entire project had been
finished. In Baldwin Contracting Co. v. Buck Building Co.87 the
contractor was retained to install sewers in the defendant's pro-
Id. at 893.
103 Mo. 578, 15 S.W. 844 (1891).
262 F. at 892 (emphasis added).
206 Cal. App. 2d 171, 23 Cal. Rptr. 483 (1962).
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
ject. After the sewers were in and "accepted" by the defendant,
they were damaged by another contractor. The plaintiff refused
to repair his original work unless paid, and the defendant agreed
to pay. The plaintiff repaired the work, but the defendant refused
to pay. At the trial the defendant asserted that the plaintiff was
obligated by the original contract to repair the damage and fur-
ther, that the plaintiff was obligated to insure his work until the
project was fully completed. Therefore, according to the defen-
dant, the promise to pay for the repairs was unenforceable be-
cause it was not supported by consideration. The court specifi-
cally rejected the defendant's consideration arguments, finding
that there had been an honest dispute as to the plaintiff's obliga-
tion to insure. The court found that the second promise to pay
was in settlement of that dispute and so was supported by consid-
eration.
This "settlement-of-a-dispute" analysis has also been used
to uphold agreements between spouses. Holsomback v.
Caldwell,8  a suit between the executors of a deceased couple, is
a good example. The husband and wife had separated, and the
wife was about to file for divorce. The husband promised her that
if she returned to him, he would leave her all his property when
he died. The husband predeceased the wife and did not leave his
property to her. Upon suit the husband's estate claimed that
there was no consideration for his promise because the wife had
been obligated to return to her husband because of the marriage
relationship. The court, however, found for the wife because she
had had grounds for divorce. They found that her return had been
in settlement of her valid claims against her husband and hence
had been consideration for his promise to leave her the property.
The case that conclusively demonstrates the relationship of
the theory of Restatement section 76 and the pre-existing duty
rule is Crown v. Cole.89 In that case, the court did not find a
reasonable and honest dispute and therefore invoked the pre-
existing duty rule to deny efficacy to the second contract. The
plaintiff had agreed to purchase the defendant's house. The price
was set, and the buyer made the initial payment of $1,500, which
was comprised of $1,000 in cash and a note for $500. After the
agreement was made, the plaintiff alleged another agreement to
the effect that the purchase by him of the seller's home was
218 Ga. 393, 128 S.E.2d 47 (1962).
211 Pa. Super. 388, 236 A.2d 532 (1967).
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conditional on the plaintiff's ability to sell his own home. The
plaintiff alleged that the consideration for the modification was
the surrender of the legal right to withhold payment of the note
and to contest its validity. The court found that there was no
consideration for the modification and denied the plaintiff's suit
to recover the money paid, saying:
This is an ingenious but unacceptable argument .... [T]he prin-
ciple [is] that the promise for a forebearance from prosecuting a
lawful claim may be a sufficient consideration for an oral promise.
However, it does not support the principle that forebearance from
contesting a valid claim constitutes consideration. A contract can-
not be based on a promise to do a thing to which a party is already
bound, except where the existence of the duty is subject to a reason-
able dispute. . . . Forebearance to assert an invalid claim, or to
interpose an invalid defense to a valid claim, by one who does not
have an honest and reasonable belief in its possible validity is not
considered sufficient consideration."
It is also interesting to note that the opinion in Crown first
disposed of a question of fraud before it dealt with the considera-
tion issue and invoked the pre-existing duty rule against the
plaintiff. Although the court specifically found that the seller was
not guilty of fraud, it was obviously concerned that the seller had
not dealt fairly. This concern is apparent in the court's addressing
the question of fraud even though the appellee-buyer had not
pursued the fraud issue on appeal."
C. Increasing Frequency of the Exception
There has been increasing liberality in the application of the
doctrines of impossibility and frustration.2 The application of
these doctrines, which attempt to accommodate within contrac-
tual relationships the effect of a change in circumstances outside
the relationship, will increase dramatically in an era in which
change itself has become perhaps the most important social
phenomenon.93 The impact of these doctrines has been profound
Id. at 392, 236 A.2d at 534.
However, the fraud theory is not pressed in this appeal. It is appellees'
present contention that the written contract was modified by a subsequent
oral agreement which made the sale of their property a condition to the
completion of the sale covered by the written agreement. A written agree-
ment can be modified by a subsequent oral agreement provided the latter is
based upon a valid consideration and is proved by evidence which is clear,
precise and convincing.
Id.
" 6 CoRaiN § 1320.
" A. ToFFLER, Furtma SHOCK (1970).
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despite the fact they are comparatively new. 4 Not surprisingly,
there are serious disagreements among jurisdictions as to the ef-
fect of particular types of changes. Such lack of unanimity is
typical of developing theories, especially as their import spreads
into other areas of legal thinking.
One might expect the expanding liberality in the application
of the doctrines of impossibility and frustration to cause a reduc-
tion in the requirements for the changed circumstances excep-
tion and to create increasing reliance on the exception. Increased
liberality in application of the changed circumstances exception
would naturally result from the expansion of the doctrines of
impossibility and frustration because the changed circumstances
required for invoking the exception need not be of the degree
required for discharge. The change in circumstances need only
dispel the taint of abusive dealing and give rise to a reasonable
and honest dispute or give grounds for a reasonable belief that one
is discharged. The difference in legal impact is the difference
between the total discharge of a contract and the amendment of
it.
V. THE MASSACHUSETTS VIEW
The pre-existing duty rule has not been a substantial barrier
to contract modification in Massachusetts because of an early
case which held that a party to a contract had an almost absolute
right to refuse to perform that contract and accept the conse-
quences of that decision, i.e., a suit for damages. Massachusetts
had no problem with the rule because surrender of the "right" to
break the first contract was consideration for the second agree-
ment. In Monroe v. Perkins15 the plaintiff had promised to build
a hotel for the defendant for a certain sum. There were some
changes in the plans, and it was alleged that the defendants
promised to make good any extra costs the plaintiffs incurred.
The suit for the added amount met the defense of no considera-
tion under the pre-existing duty rule. The court found for the
plaintiff, saying:
The parol promise, it is contended, was without consideration.
This depends entirely on the question, whether the first contract was
" The doctrine of impossibility is generally thought to have begun with Taylor v.
Caldwell, 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (K.B. 1863), and that of frustration with Krell v. Henry,
[1903] 2 K.B. 740. It is not the purpose here to confirm or refute the significance of either
opinion; rather, it is to accept them simply as fairly recent developments in the millenium
of the common law era.
," 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 298 (1830). Compare Jack R. Allen & Co. v. Farris & Co., 372
S.W.2d 582 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
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waived. The plaintiff having refused to perform that contract, as he
might do, subjecting himself to such damages as the other parties
might show they were entitled to recover, he afterward went on upon
the faith of the new promise and finished the work. This was a
sufficient consideration."
This thinking has not been limited exclusively to Massachu-
setts,97 although the courts of that jurisdiction have adhered to it
with the greatest devotion." The chief spokesman of this view of
the limited effectiveness of contract has been Mr. Justice
Holmes. In his Common Law he described the legal effect of
contract as follows:
The only universal consequence of a legally binding promise is, that
the law makes the promisor pay damages if the promised event does
not come to pass. In every case it leaves him free from interference
until the time for fulfillment has gone by, and therefore free to break
his contract if he chooses."
Later, Holmes repeated this rather pejorative assessment of con-
tract: "The duty to keep a contract at common law means a
prediction that you may pay damages if you do not keep it-and
nothing else."'' '
This so-called right to break a contract was not well received
by theorists. Barbour disputed Holmes on three grounds.'0 ' First,
specific relief was as old, if not older, a remedy than an action
for damages. Secondly, medieval lawyers tended to think exclu-
sively in terms of remedies, not rights. This tendency was espe-
cially prevalent in breach of contract because of assumpsit's tort
heritage where damages were exclusive. Barbour added that this
devotion to form might well have been nurtured by the competi-
tion between law and equity. Law courts promoted damages in
an attempt to keep the equitable contract remedies to a mini-
mum and thus enlarge their own docket. Thirdly, and most sig-
nificantly, the Holmes theory did not hold up under the scrutiny
" 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) at 305.
'7 See, e.g., Frye v. Hubbell, 74 N.H. 358, 68 A. 325 (1907); Watkins & Son v. Carrig,
91 N.H. 459, 21 A.2d 591 (1941). Other cases have discussed the theory, but courts have
found stronger bases for their decisions. See, e.g., Bishop v. Busse, 69 Ill. 403 (1873);
Goebel v. Linn, 47 Mich. 489, 11 N.W. 284 (1882).
" See, e.g., Simons v. American Dry Ginger Ale Co., 335 Mass. 521, 140 N.E.2d 649
(1967). But see Michael Chevrolet, Inc. v. Institutions for Say., 321 Mass. 215, 72 N.E.2d
514 (1947).
0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 236 (1963).
'" Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HAuv. L. REv. 457, 462 (1897).
10' Barbour, The "Right" to Break a Contract, 16 MICH. L. REV. 106, 107-09 (1917),
in SELECTED READINGS ON THE LAW OF CoNTRACTS 500 (1931).
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of Barbour's Hohfeldian analysis. Barbour maintained that mod-
ern practice in both equity and law permitted enforcement in
kind through either specific performance or restitution. There-
fore, he concluded, the primary right of a promisee is the right to
performance. Any other rights are secondary. The correlative to
a right is a duty; therefore, Barbour asserted, promisors have the
duty to perform. The ability not to perform and to suffer damages
is not a right, but rather a power.'02 He concluded:
It is submitted, therefore, that neither the history of the com-
mon law nor logic sustains the proposition that there is no legal
obligation to perform a contract or, conversely, that there is a right
to break a contract.
10 3
Others have joined Barbour in disputing Holmes and the so-
called Massachusetts view.'"4 However, the most penetrating
analysis of the flaws of the "right to break a contract" theory is
contained in King v. Duluth, Missabe & Northern Railway,' 5
where the Minnesota court said about such an assertion of power:
In such a case the obvious inference is that the party so refusing to
perform his contract is seeking to take advantage of the necessities
of the other party to force from him a promise to pay a further sum
for that which he is already legally entitled to receive. Surely it
would be a travesty on justice to hold that the party so making the
,02 In fairness to the Holmes' view of "the right to break a contract" it must be noted
that when taken to its full conclusion, this view will achieve as fair a resolution of the
underlying problems as the pre-existing duty rule analysis of this paper. Like the pre-
existing duty rule, the "right to break a contract" analysis if pursued to completion, also
denies the fruits of abusive dealing.
The Holmes' position in The Common Law was that there was a right to break a
contract subject to the payment of damages. If a party exercising "the right to break a
contract" is forced to answer in damages, abusive dealing is equally effectively stopped.
For instance, suppose A enters into a valid contract to construct a brewery for B for X
dollars. After performance begins, A exercises his "right to break a contract" and forces
B to promise to pay X plus Y dollars for the same brewery.
Under the pre-existing duty rule analysis of this paper, it is clear that A could not
enforce the promise of extra compensation because there was no consideration for it. Thus
B would have the brewery for X dollars.
Under the "right to break a contract" analysis, A could enforce the promise of extra
compensation (X plus Y dollars) because the first contract did not bind him; and there-
fore, his second performance was not the performance of a pre-existing duty. However,
A's "right to breach," according to Holmes, was subject to the payment of damages. B's
damages resulting from A's exercise of the "right to break the contract" would be Y dollars
(the difference between the cost of substituted performance-the second contract-and
the "rightfully" broken one). Thus, B would have, as justice demands, the brewery for X
dollars.
1*3 Barbour, supra note 101, 16 MIcH. L. REv. at 109, SELECTED READINGs at 503.
1o Beale, Notes on Consideration, 17 HARV. L. REv. 71, 80 (1903); Corbin, Does a Pre-
Existing Duty Defeat Consideration?, 27 YALE L.J. 362 (1918); Williston, supra note 1.
105 61 Minn. 482, 63 N.W. 1106 (1895).
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promise for extra pay was estopped from asserting that the promise
was without consideration. A party [the promisee] cannot lay the
foundation of an estoppel by his own wrong.'"
Thus, the flaw of the Massachusetts rule is that it begs the issue;
in doing so, it permits the exact injustice the pre-existing duty
rule is geared to prevent. Suffice it to say that even Massachu-
setts has recognized these weaknesses and has limited the doc-
trine. 07
VI. Two Techniques of Avoiding the Common Law
Pre-Existing Duty Rule
The facts of particular modifications have often presented
courts with an opportunity to escape altogether the perceived
boundaries of the pre-existing duty rule when they are assured
that a case involves no extortion or misdealing. Where appropri-
ate, courts have found that the second contract actually called for
additional or different acts, and that the performance of the sec-
ond contract was therefore not the performance of a pre-existing
duty. The other technique is to find a mutual rescission of the
original contract and a simultaneous entry into the second. The
first of these techniques, finding different or additional acts, is
often an accurate interpretation of the facts and therefore has a
sound legal basis."" The other technique is questionable because
too often it is not well grounded in the facts.
A. Additional or Different Acts
In D. L. Godbey & Sons Construction Co. v. Deane'019 the
plaintiff agreed to do the cement work for the foundation and
retaining walls on the defendant's building. Their original con-
tract called for the plaintiff to be paid at a rate of 76 cents per
cubic foot of cement as determined by the measurement of the
forms. Because of difficulties arising from such a computation
,0 Id. at 487, 63 N.W. at 1106, 1107.
101 Bailey v. First Realty Co., 305 Mass. 306, 25 N.E.2d 712 (1940); Fienberg v.
Adelman, 260 Mass. 143, 156 N.E. 896 (1927); Torrey v. Adams, 254 Mass. 22, 149 N.E.
618 (1925); Parrot v. Mexican Cent. Ry., 207 Mass. 184, 93 N.E. 590 (1911).
101 According to RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRAcrs § 84 (1932) (emphasis added), considera-
tion is not insufficient because of the fact
(c) that the party giving the consideration is then bound by a duty owed
to the promisor . . . to render some performance similar to that given or
promised, if the act or forbearance given or promised as consideration differs
in any way from what was previously due...
IN 39 Cal. 2d 429, 246 P.2d 946 (1952). See other construction cases finding different
acts, e.g., Smith v. Gray, 316 Ill. 488, 147 N.E. 459 (1925); Gannon v. Emtman, 66 Wash.
2d 755, 405 P.2d 254 (1965).
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and because the plans called for a good deal of cement to be
poured outside of the forms, the parties agreed to change the
method of computing payments due the plaintiff. Under the mod-
ification the plaintiff was to be paid 76 cents per cubic foot for
the cubic feet actually poured rather than as determined by mea-
surement of the forms. After completion, the plaintiff filed suit
to recover under the terms of the modification.
The defendant pleaded that there was no consideration for
the modification. The court found consideration based on the
changes in performance. The changes in the method of computa-
tion created different rights and duties. Further, the plaintiff had
promised daily reports of cubic feet poured, and both parties were
relieved of the burden of measuring the forms.
A similar situation arose in Jenkins v. Watson- Wilson Trans-
portation System, Inc., 1tO where the plaintiff agreed to haul goods
in his own truck for the defendant. Somewhat later, a special
government project involving the hauling of dangerous materials
was undertaken by the defendant. The plaintiff's equipment was
inadequate for the dangerous work, so he agreed to use a special
trailer and do the work at a lower rate than called for by his
original contract with the defendant. Subsequently, the plaintiff
sued to collect as provided for by the original agreement. The
court found for the defendant because the trips on the dangerous
project were not within the original contract.
Another application of this technique appears in Greenfield
v. Millman."' Greenfield was an attorney representing a pur-
chaser of Millman's hotel. As payment Millman agreed to take
notes secured by a purchase money mortgage. Further, Millman
orally agreed that if the third mortgage (his, it would appear) was
reduced to $15,000 and the first two mortgages were consolidated,
he would subordinate his mortgage to the others in order to facili-
tate refinancing of the first two. At a second meeting, Greenfield
offered a subordination agreement for Millman's signature. Mill-
man refused, and Greenfield said he would personally guarantee
the payment if Millman signed. Millman did and sued on the
guaranty.
Greenfield contended there was no consideration for the
guaranty because Millman was already obligated to subordinate
110 183 Neb. 634, 163 N.W.2d 123 (1968).
"1 111 So. 2d 480 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
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his mortgage. The court, in finding that there was consideration
for Greenfield's second promise, pointed out that the second su-
bordination agreement differed substantially from the first. The
second did not require the reduction of the third mortgage, nor
did it require the consolidation of the first two mortgages. Fur-
ther, it permitted a substantial increase in the interest rates on
refinancing. Because of these substantial differences, the court
reasoned that the second promise to subordinate was not a prom-
ise to perform a pre-existing duty.
In Connersville Country Club v. F. N. Bunzendahl, Inc. "' a
contractor sued to collect extra compensation because changes in
the plans upon which he had based his bid had greatly increased
the amount of work to be done. The defendant countered that the
plaintiff was not entitled to payment for its alleged extra work
because the original contract required plaintiff to build a golf
course; and, despite the changes, the plaintiff still had only built
a golf course (albeit a different one!). The court clearly stated the
rationale behind the additional work theory, but then mixed it
with the changed or unforeseen circumstances exception to reach
a confused, but nonetheless just, conclusion. It said:
If we were to accept appellant's position and argument, the
appellant could theoretically be entitled to a golf course which could
run from Connersville to Indianapolis [in excess of 50 miles], and
at a price not to exceed the maximum stated in the contract. This
is an absurd deduction, but where do we draw the line? We do not
intend to state a hard and fast rule which can be applied in every
case, for each case has its special circumstances, but it is clear that
in this case where the appellant has made substantial deviations of
a nature which were unforeseen and unanticipated by the appellee;
and, also, where the magnitude of deviation does not normally arise
in such contracts, then we have no choice but to strike down the
maximum price provision [of the original contract]. To hold other-
wise would not only be unjust, but also unconscionable, and such a
result, this court cannot countenance."'
B. Mutual Rescission
A second major way that courts avoid the pre-existing duty
rule is by the mutual rescission technique. In a situation where
parties have entered into a contract and then subsequently modi-
fied it, altering the performance of one of the parties, a court may
conclude, without thorough analytical development, that the par-
ties mutually rescinded the first contract and substituted the
140 Ind. App. 215, 222 N.E.2d 417 (1966).
Id. at 228, 222 N.E.2d at 426.
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second in its place. At the outset, this technique must be distin-
guished from the Massachusetts view. The Massachusetts view is
not a mutual rescission analysis; it is that one party had the right
to refuse to perform and suffer a suit for damages. Under the
Massachusetts view the consideration for the second contract is
the forbearance from the right to answer only in damages. Mutual
rescission, on the other hand, is a voluntary act of both parties;
the consideration is either the mutual releases or the second set
of obligations.
The best example of the mutual rescission technique is
Schwartzreich v. Bauman-Basch, Inc., ' which dealt with a mod-
ification of an employment contract. Schwartzreich, a talented
designer, contracted in writing to work for Bauman-Basch comm-
encing in November of 1917 at a salary of $90 per week for a
period of 1 year. In October, Schwartzreich was offered more
money to work for someone else. He discussed the offer with
Bauman-Basch; and, as a result of the talk, a new written con-
tract was drawn calling for a salary of $100 per week. At that time
Schwartzreich gave his copy of the first contract to Bauman, and
there was some testimony that the signatures were torn off the
first contract. Schwartzreich worked under the second agreement
until December, when he was fired.
Schwartzreich filed suit for damages because of the breach
of the second contract. The defense was that there was no consid-
eration for the second contract because Schwartzreich had merely
promised to perform a pre-existing duty. The court found for
Schwartzreich by finding a mutual rescission and hence no pre-
existing duty. The rescission analysis has some merit in
Schwartzreich because the facts as to the handing back of the
original contract and the tearing off of the signatures provide
some evidence upon which to base a finding of mutual rescission.
Too often, however, cases resorting to the mutual rescission
analysis do not have quite so firm a footing in the facts. A good
example is Sasso v. K. G. & G. Realty & Construction Co.," 5
where the plaintiff was prevented from fulfilling a contract to
install tile in the defendant's building because of an unforeseen
scarcity of tile and a dramatic rise in its price."' The parties
114 231 N.Y. 196, 131 N.E. 887 (1921).
115 98 Conn. 571, 120 A. 158 (1923).
.. This appears to have been a perfect case for application of the unforeseen circum-
stances exception analysis based on problems arising from the entry into World War I.
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subsequently agreed that the defendant would reimburse the
plaintiff for the amount of the increased cost of tile. Confirming
this understanding, the defendant wrote the plaintiff:
"On February 10, 1920, you entered into a contract with our com-
pany. . . . You have been delayed in your work on account of the
scarcity of tile and in the meantime the price of materials has ad-
vanced. We are, therefore, willing in order to assist you in complet-
ing your contract, to agree to pay you the difference in the cost of
materials over and above the prices submitted in a schedule that
you sent us ... "117
In the suit by the plaintiff to enforce this modification, the defen-
dant pleaded that there had been no consideration for it. The
court found the consideration question not to be material because
what actually had happened was an abandonment or rescission
of the original contract. The consideration for the defendant's
promise to pay the increased cost had been the plaintiff's promise
to do the work.
The difficulty with the decision is not the result, but the
finding of a mutual rescission. Upon what facts is the finding
based? Here, there was no handing back of the copies of the
original agreement nor any testimony about tearing off signa-
tures, which had justified the finding in Schwartzreich. Further,
the defendant's letter specifically spoke in terms of completing
the contract, not of abandoning it as the court found.
Critics of the mutual rescission analysis have condemned it
because of its total disregard of reality."' Frequently there is not
even the slightest hint that the parties feel themselves totally
relieved from their contractual obligations. At no point do the
parties believe that either of them may abandon the contract with
impunity. The most incisive reprobation of the mutual rescission
analysis is contained in Comment b of section 89D of The Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts:
The same result called for by paragraph (a) [i.e., effective modifica-
tion] is sometimes reached on the ground that the original contract
was "rescinded" by mutual agreement and that new promises were
then made which furnished consideration for each other. That
theory is rejected-here because it is fictitious when the "rescission"
and new agreement are simultaneous, and because if logically car-
However, the court did not touch on it, and it must be assumed that counsel did not offer
it. That the court was open to such analysis is demonstrated by its later opinion in
Blakeslee v. Board of Water Comm'rs., 106 Conn. 642, 139 A. 106 (1927).
98 Conn. at 574, 120 A. at 159 (emphasis added).
1,8 1A CORBIN § 186; 1 WILLISTON § 130A.
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ried out it might uphold unfair and inequitable modifications.1 9
In King v. Duluth, Missabe & Northern Railway 2° Justice
Start criticized cases using the mutual rescission doctrine: "The
doctrine in these cases as it is frequently applied does not com-
mend itself either to our judgment or our sense of justice ... "2
VII. RELIANCE ON THE MODIFICATION
Another way courts may avoid the pre-existing duty rule and
enforce contract modifications is by finding that a party has re-
lied on an otherwise unenforceable modification. Restatement
(Second) of Contracts section 89D provides that reliance on a
modification makes that modification enforceable. Lord Denning
included reliance on a modification as the basis for its enforce-
ment in his article, Recent Developments in the Doctrine of
Consideration.22 However novel such a theory may have been for
contemporary England, reliance as a basis for enforcement of
modifications was well established in American case law at a
much earlier time. Wadsworth v. Thompson,2 3 an early Illinois
case, clearly found that reliance by the promisee was considera-
tion for a contract modification.
There, Thompson secured the repayment of a loan to him
from Wadsworth by delivering possession of certain items of per-
sonal property to Wadsworth. The parties understood that the
personal property was to be forfeited if Thompson failed to repay
at the due date of the loan. A short time prior to the time for
repayment, Thompson told Wadsworth that he would be unable
to repay on time and asked that the notes be renewed. Wadsworth
refused to renew the notes, but agreed to extend the time for
repayment by 3 weeks.
Prior to the expiration of the 3-week extension, Thompson
tendered the repayment. Wadsworth informed him that he was
willing to accept the money, but a part of the personal property
"I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89D, comment b at 212 (Tent. Draft Nos.
1-7, 1973).
11 61 Minn. 482, 63 N.W. 1105 (1895).
21 Id. at 486, 63 N.W. at 1106.
"2 15 MODERN L. REV. 1 (1952). Contra, Bennson, Want of Consideration, 16 MODERN
L. REV. 441 (1953).
'- 8 Ill. 423 (1846). See also, Beach v. Covillard, 4 Cal. 316 (1854); American Food
Co. v. Halstead, 165 Ind. 633, 76 N.E. 251 (1905); Pratt v. Morrow, 45 Mo. 404, 100 Am.
Dec. 381 (1870); Arbogast v. Mylius, 55 W. Va. 101, 46 S.E. 809 (1904). Contra, Fichter
v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union Local 753, 382 Ill. 91, 46 N.E.2d 921 (1943). However, the
reliance on the alleged modification was beneficial rather than detrimental.
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had been sold at auction, and those items could not be returned.
Instead, Wadsworth offered to credit Thompson's account with
the money received from the sale. Thompson refused and sued
Wadsworth for trover and conversion of the goods sold.
On appeal, Wadsworth raised the question of consideration
for the extension. In finding for the plaintiff, Justice Koerner,
said:
Neither a court of Law, or a court of Chancery, can permit fraud or
circumvention to be perpetrated in this manner. I do not mean to
say that there was actually a fraud intended in this case, but the
failure to keep the promise had identically the same effect as if
wilful deceit and imposition had been practised. If the promise of
extension had not been made, it is [sic] is it not reasonable to
suppose that Thomson [sic] would have strained every nerve to
rescue goods, considered by him worth $1,000 [the loan was for
$305.00], from impending sacrifice? He had several days left to
make arrangements for the redemption of his property, but by the
act of the defendants he was lulled into a false and dangerous secu-
rity. He suspended his efforts, and when he proposed paying the
money within the time, he had been told that his property would not
be considered as forfeited, he had found to his great surprise, that
part of it had already been disposed of under the auctioneer's ham-
mer, and at great loss. We cannot now, in justice, admit of such a
defence as this: "True, we extended the time, and told you that he
[sic] (we) would not claim the goods as our own, but as you did not
pay us a cent, or hand over a pepper-corn, we were not bound by
our promise, and you must submit to the loss." Even if the promise
of the defendants had been wholly gratuitous, we would still hold
that under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the extension of
time would be binding upon the defendants.'
2'
The detailed analysis of the facts, the recognition of the import
of those facts, and most significantly, the concern with Thomp-
son's reactions to Wadsworth's promise to extend the time indi-
cate that the court adopted the reliance theory as a means of
enforcing the modification. But Thompson is by no means an
atypical analysis. 125
124 8 Ill. at 430-31. Compare Wadsworth with Central London Property Trust Ltd. v.
High Trees House Ltd. [1956] 1 K.B. 130, where Lord Denning maintained that reliance
on a modification was a recent development in England. The changed or unforeseen
circumstances exception also could have been applied to the High Trees case. See also
Kelley v. R.F. Jones Co., 22 Cal. App. 113, 77 Cal. Rptr. 170 (1969); King Constr. Co. v.
W.M. Smith Elec. Co., 350 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961); cf. De Blois v. Boylston &
Tremont Corp., 281 Mass. 498, 183 N.E. 823 (1933).
121 See, e.g., Strahn v. Johnson, 197 Iowa 1324, 196 N.W. 731 (1924); Blaess v. Nichols




In Carter Realty Co. v. Carlisle' a purchaser of land gave
the seller notes for the land. The purchaser made part payment,
and the parties then agreed that he would reconvey the land to
the seller and take back the notes. Under the modified agreement
the seller was to keep the cash that had been paid by the pur-
chaser and return only the notes. The purchaser reconveyed the
land, but the seller could not return the notes because he had
negotiated them to a bank. However, the seller assured the buyer
that the notes would be cancelled. The court described the pur-
chaser's subsequent conduct in a way that made clear what the
decision had to be. It said, "[R]elying upon and depending upon
this agreement, [to return only the notes], [he] bought another
home at a great expense to himself and thereby placed himself
in a position where he had no need for the lot originally purchased
. . " 7 The court, of course, found for the purchaser and en-
forced the modification of the contract. In so doing, the court
cited Moses v. Woodward'8 as authority and fell in line with a
series of Florida cases. 1"9
The best indication of Florida's devotion to reliance as a
means of enforcement of modifications appears in a federal case
interpreting and applying the Florida rule. The case is Canada v.
Allstate Insurance Co., 130 in which the court infers the existence
of a modification upon which the company could rely. Canada
was an agent for the company. His employment contract specifi-
cally provided that he was entitled to compensation only during
the term of employment; he would receive no commission on
policies he had written during his employment which were re-
newed after he had left the company. The contract also required
written notice of termination. Canada was asked to resign, but
refused. He was then informed orally that he was fired. There-
after, he conducted himself as if his employment had been termi-
nated; i.e., he turned in his supplies, accepted termination pay,
and withdrew from the Allstate benefit programs.
The majority of the court found, based on the conduct of the
parties, that an oral modification of the employment contract had
128 113 Fla. 143, 151 So. 498 (1933).
" Id. at 145, 151 So. at 499.
28 109 Fla. 348, 147 So. 690 (1933).
2 90 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 1956); Harris v. Air Conditioning Corp., 76 So. 2d 877 (Fla.
1955); Tussing v. Smith, 125 Fla. 578, 171 So. 238 (1936).
1- 411 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1969).
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taken place, permitting oral notice of termination.'3 ' Allstate re-
lied on the modification by paying the commissions on the policy
renewals to Canada's successor, thus making the oral termination
under the modification enforceable.
Another case, St. Louis Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v.
Lewis, ,31 is both tragic and charming. It demonstrates that facts
which lend themselves to the enforcement of a modification on
the basis of reliance can also lend themselves to a finding of
consideration. Lewis owned a horse named Magnolia Dandy on
which he carried an insurance policy with the defendant. He sold
Magnolia Dandy and purchased Kaplan Twist. Lewis contacted
the defendant's local agent, complied with the company's de-
mands for verification of the animal's health, and succeeded in
obtaining the company's assurance that the coverage had been
switched to the new horse. Soon thereafter, Kaplan Twist died.
Investigation disclosed that the animal's intestine had become
twisted on its spine, causing gas to back up into its stomach.
Eventually, the stomach burst; its contents clogged the lungs,
causing death.'
3
The insurance company defended against Lewis' claim by
contending there was no consideration for the change of coverage,
i.e., the modification. On this issue the court found for Lewis.1
3
1
It observed that when Lewis cancelled the insurance on Magnolia
Dandy, a refund was due him under the policy. Foregoing his
right to that refund was sufficient consideration for the different
coverage. However, had it chosen to, the court could have rea-
soned that Lewis' foregoing his right to the refund and not seeking
alternative coverage was reliance on the company's assurance of
the change of coverage. Such reasoning would have been an exact
duplication of the Illinois court's analysis in Wadsworth v.
Thompson. 
35
"' The dissent disagreed that Canada's actions subsequent to oral notice could con-
stitute assent to the modification. Rather, Judge Codbold argued that Canada's conduct
was as consistent with his obligation to mitigate and perfect his rights as it was with assent
to modification.
1312 230 So. 2d 580 (Miss. 1970).
"I Those who are prone to disrespect the dead might observe that Kaplan Twist had
literally drowned in his own bile.
134 The case was remanded to the trial court for a better determination of Kaplan
Twist's value.
'- 8 Ill. 423 (1846). For other examples of passive reliance in the belief that insurance
was in force, see Lusk-Harbison-Jones, Inc. v. Universal Credit Co., 164 Miss. 693, 145
So. 623 (1933); Kukuska v. Home Mutual Hail Tornado Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 166, 235 N.W.
403 (1931).
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Thus, it is clear that reliance by the parties on a modification
of an executory bilateral contract can constitute the basis for the
legal efficacy of the modification. Such a use of the concept of
reliance overcomes some of the difficulties of the pre-existing
duty rule. However, one shortcoming of the reliance theory is that
it does not necessarily satisfy the need to demonstrate freedom
from misdealing. The extracted or extorted promise that con-
cerned the court in Lingenfelder v. Wainwright Brewery Co. 3 6 can
easily turn into extorted performance. Thus, although the reli-
ance analysis may avoid the pre-existing duty rule, it may well
also lose the benefit of it.
VIII. MODIFICATION WITHOUT CONSIDERATION
Partly in response to the apparent contradictions in the pre-
existing duty rule (especially as it has been aggravated by the
distaste for the Doctrine of Foakes v. Beer),' 7 and partly in re-
sponse to the needs and business practices of fast-moving entre-
preneurs, attempts have been made to remove consideration as a
requirement for effective modification.' 3 The leading example of
such an attempt is section 2-209(1) of the Uniform Commercial
Code.3 9 Comment 1 states the purpose of the section:
[T]o protect and make effective all necessary and desirable modifi-
cations of sales contracts without regard to the technicalities which
at present hamper such adjustments. 0
The "technicalities" to which the comment refers must be the
pre-existing duty rule. Also note that Comment 1 limits itself to
"necessary" and "desirable" modification.
131 103 Mo. 578, 15 S.W. 844 (1891).
137 9 App. Cas. 605 (1884). See text accompanying notes 14-21 supra.
138 See Gateway Co. v. Charlotte Theatres, Inc. 297 F.2d 483 (1st Cir. 1961) (dictum);
Lunsford v. Wilson, 113 Ga. App. 602, 149 S.E.2d 515 (1966) (dictum); Andrews v. Wilkie,
181 Neb. 398, 148 N.W.2d 924 (1967).
'39 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-209. Subsection (2) of 2-209 permits a private
Statute of Frauds to be included in the original contract, thus limiting any modification
to a writing. This formal validation technique as an alternative to the informal one of
consideration is no doubt fundamental to the Code's approach to the problem of modifica-
tion. See Comment 3 to 2-209. There is the distinct possibility that the parties may orally
waive the clause which requires a written modification and then modify the contract; see
C.I.T. Corp. v. Jonnet, 419 Pa. 435, 214 A.2d 620 (1965). Nonetheless, the formal valida-
tion technique, as opposed to the informal one, presents problems all its own, and does
not necessarily overcome the difficulties implicit in the pre-existing duty analysis. For an
excellent analysis of New York's difficulties with its formal modification device as a
substitute for a consideration analysis, see Comment, Modification of a Contract in New
York: Criteria for Enforcement, 35 U. Cm. L. REv. 173 (1967).
'" UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-209, Comment 1.
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Some clarification of what is meant by "necessary" and
"desirable" is given in Comment 2, which states:
However, modifications made thereunder must meet the test of
good faith imposed by this Act. The effective use of bad faith to
escape performance on the original contract terms is barred, and the
extortion of a "modification" without legitimate commercial reason
is ineffective as a violation of the duty of good faith. Nor can a mere
technical consideration support a modification made in bad faith.
The test of "good faith" between merchants or as against mer-
chants includes "observance of reasonable commercial standards of
fair dealing in the trade . . ." and may in some situations require
an objectively demonstrable reason for seeking a modification. But
such matters as a market shift which makes performance come to
involve a loss may provide such a reason even though there is no
such unforeseen difficulty as would make out a legal excuse from
performance .... "
When read with Comment 2, section 2-209(1) does not seem as
radical a departure from the common law requirement of consid-
eration as it might appear to be from its words, "needs no consid-
eration to be binding." On the contrary, read with Comment 2,
section 2-209(1) is quite in accord with what has been demon-
strated in this article to be the common law approach to modifi-
cations through the pre-existing duty rule.
Clearly, Comment 2 states that 2-209(1) will not be used to
permit extortion, exactly the concern of the court in Lingenfelder
v. Wainwright Brewery Co. I Moreover, the comment falls in line
with this article's analysis of the pre-existing duty rule by point-
ing out that the existence of a legitimate commercial reason dis-
pels any inference of extortion.'43 The similarity of 2-209(1) and
this analysis of the pre-existing duty rule is reinforced by the
statement in Comment 2 that the good faith test may in some
situations require an objectively demonstrable reason for the
modification.' And in noting that market shifts causing loss to
one party may be the basis of a modification even if the shifts are
insufficient to excuse performance under the Code's equivalent of
impossibility, Comment 2 is in total agreement with the point
made earlier that surrender of a reasonable and honest belief in
a claim to discharge from the first contract is consideration for a
second contract.
4 5
14 Id., Comment 2.
lZ 103 Mo. 578, 15 S.W. 844 (1891). See text accompanying notes 39-44 supra.
", See text accompanying notes 71-75 supra.
'" See text accompanying notes 75-76 supra.
", See text accompanying notes 76-90 supra.
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
The similarity of this analysis of the pre-existing duty rule
and the approach of finding modifications enforceable without
consideration can also be seen in cases. In Carpenter Paper Co.
v. Kearney Hub Publishing Co., 4' a pre-Code case applying the
no-consideration rule subsequently enacted by 2-209(1), the va-
lidity of a modification of a contract to supply newsprint was
questioned. The modification consisted of an increased price to
which the buyer objected on the grounds of economic coercion.
The court invoked the rule that an executory contract may be
changed by a subsequent agreement which does not require any
new consideration. It went on, however, to report in detail the
relations between the parties and the state of the paper business.
The court satisfied itself that the seller's conduct was fair and
reasonable in the light of all that had transpired in the industry
over the years. Further, it found that the seller treated the buyer
in the same manner it had treated all its customers. In all, the
court found nothing reprehensible in the seller's conduct and was
satisfied that the seller had not been guilty of any misdealing.
Thus satisfied, the court, in keeping with 2-209, Comment 2, held
that no consideration was necessary for the modification. '47
Another case invoking the rule that consideration is unneces-
sary for modification also lends itself to the analysis of the pre-
existing duty rule set forth earlier. The case, citing 2-209(1) as its
basis, is Skinner v. Tober Foreign Motors, Inc.' The plaintiff
sought the return of an airplane he had purchased from the defen-
dants. Under their original contract, the plaintiff was to make 24
monthly payments of $200 each and a 25th payment of $353.34.
Before the due date of the first payment, the plane developed
engine trouble. It was discovered that the plane required a new
engine costing $1,400. The plaintiff could not afford to purchase
both the new engine and the airplane, so he offered to return the
plane to the seller. The defendant-seller decided that it would
alleviate the buyer's financial burden by reducing the first year's
'" 163 Neb. 145, 78 N.W.2d 80 (1956).
" Had the court been in a jurisdiction which required consideration for effective
modification and had the buyer then raised the pre-existing duty rule, the court could
have applied the changed or unforeseen circumstances exception. The original supply
contract had been made in 1942 and the modification in 1947. World War II could have
been found to have caused sufficient changes in market conditions to justify application
of the exception; see Blakeslee v. Board of Water Comm'rs, 106 Conn. 642, 139 A. 106
(1927).
"1 345 Mass. 429, 187 N.E.2d 669 (1963).
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payments to $100 per month. After about 6 months, the defen-
dant informed the plaintiff that $200 per month would be neces-
sary. Eventually the defendant repossessed the plane, giving rise
to the suit for its return.
The defendant maintained that the alleged modification was
unenforceable because it lacked consideration. The court found
for the plaintiff on the basis of section 2-209(1). However, had the
Code not been in force, an identical result could have been
achieved under this article's analysis of the pre-existing duty
rule.
The defendant would have alleged that there had been no
consideration for the modification because the plaintiff, by prom-
ising to pay $100 per month, was merely promising to perform a
pre-existing duty in that the original contract already required
plaintiff to pay $200. The court could have found consideration
by means of the following analysis:
1. The faulty engine constituted a breach of the sales con-
tract. At least it gave the plaintiff a reasonable and honest belief
in a claim for breach, or in his right to declare the contract at an
end;
2. The consideration for the reduced payment was the
plaintiff's forbearance from assertion of that claim.
Thus, both in the comments to 2-209(1) and in the outcome
of the cases, the pre-existing duty rule and the right to modifica-
tion are opposite sides of the same coin. Any modification that
would be unenforceable because of the pre-existing duty rule
would also fall short of the Code tests of good faith and reasonable
commercial standard of fair dealing.
Section 89D of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts re-
flects the same attitude.'49 It places the modification of executory
contracts in the portion of the Restatement entitled, "Contracts
Without Consideration." However, the Restatement Second's
approach is slightly different from the Code's.
It requires for effective modifications without consideration,
that they be "fair and equitable in view of circumstances not
anticipated by the parties when the contract was made."'' 0 Com-
ment b following the section, directed at the pre-existing duty
aspect of modification, explains that the fair and equitable test
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89D (Tent. Draft No. 1-7, 1973).
I Id. at § 89D(a).
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goes beyond the mere absence of coercion. It requires an objec-
tively demonstrable reason for seeking a modification. The
Restatement view is thus consistent with the assertion in this
article that an understanding of the pre-existing duty rule re-
quires investigation beyond the superficial contract questions
surrounding the making of the second contract. 5' It is also consis-
tent with the assertion that the application of the pre-existing
duty rule is really determined by the justification for refusing to
perform the original contract.15
However, the second substantive implication of Comment b
to section 89D is not in such perfect accord with this analysis. It
maintains that "[t]he reason for modification must rest in cir-
cumstances not 'anticipated' as part of the context in which the
contract was made ... " 3 This would appear to limit avoid-
ance of the pre-existing duty rule to the changed or unforeseen
circumstances exception. Such a limitation, if it is in fact in-
tended, is somewhat restrictive in view of the other techniques for
avoiding the rule covered in this analysis. However, read together
with the "fair and equitable" requirement of the section itself,
there is no such limitation. This paper's analysis of the pre-
existing duty rule, therefore, remains essentially compatible with
the views of the drafters of the new Restatement who, to overcome
the burden of the pre-existing duty rule, eliminated consideration
as a requirement for modification.
It should be no surprise that the Restatement theory that
just modifications of executory contracts are effective without
consideration is in fundamental agreement with this paper's
analysis of the rule. This article has shown that the seemingly
inconsistent applications of the pre-existing duty rule result from
courts' using the rule to prevent abusive dealing. A rule doing
away with the requirement of consideration for modifications, but
requiring such modifications to meet standards of fairness, rea-
sonableness, and freedom of assent, is in complete accord with
the traditional use of the pre-existing duty rule as articulated in
this analysis. To the extent that UCC 2-209(1) and Restatement
(Second) section 89D bring standards of fairness more to the ana-
lytical forefront in resolving the question of enforceability of mod-
151 See text accompanying notes 75-76 supra.
"' See text accompanying notes 39-53 supra.




ifications than did the judicial reliance on the pre-existing duty
rule, these contemporary statements of the principles are a signif-
icant improvement. They are better because they make the cri-
teria for enforcement patent, and thus serve to minimize confu-
sion resulting from seemingly contradictory applications of the
pre-existing duty rule.
IX. FACT PATTERNS WHICH DISPEL SUSPICIONS OF ABUSIVE
DEALING
When courts have satisfied themselves that there is an ab-
sence of abusive dealing, they have found a means of enforcing
the new agreement either by applying the changed circumstances
exception to the pre-existing duty rule or by avoiding the rule
entirely by employing one of the other techniques. An earlier
section surveyed cases where courts applied the pre-existing duty
rule to prevent abusive dealing.'54 Here will be surveyed various
kinds of fact patterns which induce courts not to apply the rule.
The cases illustrate the various ways courts escape the pre-
existing duty rule.
A. Misperception of the Subject Matter
In numerous instances the parties to a contract have seri-
ously misjudged the subject matter of their contract and then, on
the basis of that misjudgment, seriously miscalculated the work
to be done. In such cases courts have determined the validity of
the second contract which takes into account the changed condi-
tions on the basis of one of the following: (1) consideration arising
from settlement of an honest dispute; (2) a significant change in
the work to be done, so that doing the additional work is not
performance of a pre-existing duty; or (3) allocation of the respon-
sibility for the misjudgment. Most of the court opinions reflect,
to differing degrees, each of these techniques.
A case fully in accord with the analysis presented here is
Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory v. Farnsworth & Chambers Co.'55
The court discussed the changed circumstances exception and
used the "settlement-of-disputes analysis," but only as alterna-
tives. It never mentioned the relationship of the doctrines.5 ,
Pittsburgh agreed to test the concrete installed by Farn-
' See text accompanying notes 54-65 supra.
155 251 F.2d 77 (10th Cir. 1958).
" Id. at 79.
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sworth on the runways of an airport Farnsworth was constructing
as general contractor. Farnsworth estimated that the work would
take 7 months and agreed to pay Pittsburgh $24,450 for the test-
ing during that time. However, the estimate of time was based
on Farnsworth's belief that 600,000 tons of dirt would have to be
moved. As it turned out twice that amount of dirt was moved, and
the construction was delayed accordingly. Pittsburgh refused to
honor the lump sum contract, the parties renegotiated, and a new
contract was created. When Farnsworth refused to honor the sec-
ond contract, Pittsburgh sued to enforce it.
The court found consideration on either of two grounds.
First, the changed circumstances took the case outside the pre-
existing duty rule. And second, there was a valid dispute over the
original contract. The time limit in the original contract was 7
months; Pittsburgh's performance was clearly pushed beyond
that limit. Therefore, the second contract was viewed as a settle-
ment of the valid time dispute arising from the original contract.
The court, while it chose the two theories of major concern to this
analysis, implicitly also expressed concern that the miscalcula-
tion of the dirt to be moved was entirely Farnsworth's responsibil-
ity; and, as a result, Pittsburgh was required to do more work
than had been contemplated by the original contract.'57 Pursuing
this reasoning, the court could have completely avoided the pre-
existing duty rule and found that the additional work actually
constituted a different duty.
A similar result obtained in a California case, Healy v.
Brewster,' where a subcontractor relied on earth core samples
taken and supplied by the county. The core samples were taken
in an unprofessional manner and failed to disclose a layer of
hardpan (a rocklike stratum) through which the contractor had
to bore. This required additional work and the defendant-general
contractor's representative authorized the subcontractor to go
ahead with the work. The defendant's representative also assured
him that he would be compensated for the extra expense by the
county. Upon failure of the general contractor to pay for the extra
efforts, the subcontractor brought suit. The defendant, among
IS Compare Pittsburgh Testing Lab. with Watkins & Son v. Carrig, 91 N.H. 459, 21
A.2d 591 (1941), where the court gives the reader a choice between a mutual rescission
analysis or a gift analysis.
Im 251 Cal. App. 2d 541, 59 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1967). See also Bailey v. Breetwor, 206
Cal. App. 2d 287, 23 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1962); Evergreen Amusement Corp. v. Milstead, 206
Md. 610, 112 A.2d 901 (Ct. App. 1955).
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other things, pleaded that there was no consideration for the
modification.
The court held that the subcontractor could recover for the
extra work and expenses on the basis that the county's core sam-
ples were misleading and constituted a breach of an implied war-
ranty of their correctness. Further, the court found consideration
because the existence of the hardpan constituted a mutual mis-
take of fact sufficient to justify the subcontractor in seeking to
rescind the original contract. Therefore, pursuing the work for the
promise of additional compensation was simply forebearance by
the subcontractor from asserting a valid legal claim to discharge
and, as such, was consideration for the general contractor's subse-
quent promise.
The California court spelled out the relationship of: (1) the
pre-existing duty rule, (2) the changed circumstances exception
to it, and (3) the causal connection of a change in circumstances
to the creation and subsequent settlement of a valid legal dispute.
Lastly, the decision made clear the dependence of the efficacy of
a modification of an executory bilateral contract on those three
concepts.
Another case involving misjudgment is Grand Trunk R. Co.
v. H. W. Nelson Co. 5' In that case the defendant railroad mis-
judged the intentions of its neighbors. The plaintiff was retained
to construct some track for the railroad. Construction was de-
layed and the proposed route was changed twice because persons
in the vicinity of each of the first two routes threatened to enforce
negative easements against the property in order to keep the rail-
road out. The defendant promised to reimburse the plaintiff for
the extra expenses resulting from the delay, but later reneged on
that promise. The court enforced the promise of extra compensa-
tion on the basis that the extra work was a result of the changed
circumstances (i.e., the fact that enforcement of the easement
was threatened).
Typical of the "change in duty" analysis is Gannon v.
Emtman,6 0 where the plaintiff agreed to prepare the defendant's
land for irrigation farming for $6,000. The written contract con-
templated leveling and grading. It further provided that if rock
removal became necessary, it would be done for $16.50 per hour.
159 116 F.2d 823 (6th Cir. 1941).
1 66 Wash. 2d 755, 405 P.2d 254 (1965).
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After work began, rock removal became necessary and, addition-
ally, a need arose to move fill from another area to the area from
which the rocks had been removed. The defendant orally agreed
to pay the $16.50 hourly rate for moving fill.
After the defendant failed to pay for moving the fill, the
plaintiff sued. The defendant asserted the pre-existing duty rule.
The court found consideration and decided the case in the plain-
tiff's favor. The court pointed out that the doing of an act neither
expressly nor implicitly part of the existing contract, nor
contemplated by that contract, falls outside the pre-existing duty
rule. The parties had never contemplated the need to move fill
from one area of the land to another. Therefore, moving it was not
performance of a pre-existing contractual duty.'
However, the court in Gannon recognized that the underly-
ing concern was abusive dealing. It observed that when the need
to move fill arose, the parties had four alternatives. They could
have lowered the overall grade; they could have decided to borrow
dirt from the area being leveled; they could have decided to bring
fill from an adjacent area; or they could have determined to aban-
don the project. The court concluded its observation by finding
that the alternative selected was not unreasonable.
The court's allocation of responsibility for the misjudgment
or miscalculation can be seen in two cases. In Simpson Timber
Co. v. Palm berg Construction Co. I the court found that the con-
tractor was not entitled to extra compensation simply because of
greater difficulty in meeting its contractual obligation. The court
was convinced that the contractor could have discovered the
greater difficulty by reasonable inspection. And in James A. Hag-
gerty Lumber & Mill Work, Inc. v. Thompson Starrett Construc-
tion Co. 63 a buyer was not permitted to enforce the seller's subse-
quent promise to renegotiate on the basis of a claim by the buyer
that the orders (29 in number) had been hastily given without
attention to price.
B. Unforeseen Natural Phenomena
Goebel v. Linn"4 is a classic example of the unforeseen cir-
'' See also Smith v. Gray, 316 Ill. 488, 147 N.E. 459 (1925); Baldwin's Steel Erection
Co. v. Champy Constr. Co., 353 Mass. 711, 234 N.E.2d 763 (1968).
192 377 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1967).
183 22 App. Div. 2d 509, 256 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (1965).
164 47 Mich. 489, 11 N.W. 284 (1882). It is interesting to note that in Lingenfelder v.
Wainwright Brewery Co., 103 Mo. 578, 155 S.W. 844 (1891), Justice Gantt misconstrued
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cumstances exception where the unforeseen circumstances were
in natural phenomena. The plaintiff's assignor "' entered into a
contract to supply ice to the defendant's brewery from November
1879 through December 1881. The amount of ice was to be dic-
tated by the defendant's needs. The price was to be $1.75 per ton,
and in the event of a shortage during the 1880 season, the price
would be $2.00 per ton (in contemporary analysis, it would be said
that the ice company had assumed the risk of a mild winter
beyond any shortage driving the price above $2.00 per ton). Ice
was supplied under the contract until May of 1880, at which time
the defendants were notified by the ice company that no more ice
could be supplied under the contract because the exceedingly
mild winter had severely reduced the ice crop. Negotiations took
place seeking to reach an agreement at a higher price. The defen-
dant was in a precarious position because, without an adequate
supply of ice, the brewing process could not continue and the
inventory and work in progress would be a total loss. The parties
finally agreed to a price of $3.50 per ton, and notes were issued
for this amount. All the notes were paid except the one in contro-
versy. The defendant sought to assert the payments on previous
notes as a set off against the plaintiff's suit on the note in ques-
tion, because, in the defendant's view, those payments of the
notes constituted overpayment on the original ice supply con-
tract.
Goebel, confusing the concept of a duty to pay a sum certain with strictly executory
contractual duties. See text accompanying notes 14-23 supra. In Lingenfelder Justice
Gantt stated:
It is true that as eminent a jurist as Judge Cooley, in Goebel v. Linn
• . . held that an ice company which had agreed to furnish a brewery with
all the ice they might need for their business from November 8, 1879 until
January 8, 1881, at $1.75 per ton, and afterwards, in May, 1880, declined to
deliver any more ice unless the brewery would give it $3 per ton, could
recover on a promissory note given for the increased price. Profound as is our
respect for the distinguished judge who delivered that opinion, we are still
of the opinion that his decision is not in accord with the almost universally
accepted doctrine, and is not convincing, and certainly so much of the opin-
ion as held that the payment by a debtor of a part of the debt then due would
constitute a defense to a suit for the remainder is not the law of this state,
nor do we think of any other where the common law prevails.
Id. at 594, 155 S.W. at 848. Contrary to Justice Gantt's interpretation of Goebel, that case
is in basic agreement with the Lingenfelder analysis. Both cases illustrate the relationship
of the fear of abusive dealings and the enforcement of contract modifications. In
Lingenfelder the court found no reasonable basis for altering the original agreement. In
Goebel the court found the plaintiffs insistence on a higher price reasonable.
'" Although the subject of the litigation was a note, presumably a negotiable one, the
plaintiff was treated as an assignee rather than as a holder in due course, apparently
because the note was transferred to him after it had become due.
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The defendant alleged that there was no consideration for the
promise to pay the higher amount and that the promise had been
obtained by duress. The court disputed the defendant's consider-
ation argument, finding that there was consideration in that ice
had in fact been supplied. The court framed the issue in terms of
the pre-existing duty rule when it summarized the defendant's
position: "What the defendants disputed is, the justice of compel-
ling them to pay the sum stipulated in the note when according
to their previous contract they ought to have received the ice for
a sum much smaller."'
6
In finding for the ice company's assignee, the court reflected
the same concern with abusive dealing that Lingenfelder had:
If the ice company had the ability to perform their contract, but took
advantage of the circumstances to extort a higher price from the
necessities of the defendants, its conduct was reprehensible, and it
would perhaps have been in the interest of good morals if defendants
had temporarily submitted to the loss and brought suit against the
ice company on their contract. 7
However, in finding that the ice company's conduct was not in
fact reprehensible, the court found that the unusually mild winter
brought the case within what King v. Duluth, Missabe & North-
ern Railway' later designated as the changed or unforeseen cir-
cumstances exception. The Michigan court described the effect
of the mild winter as follows:
Unexpected and extraordinary circumstances had rendered the con-
tract worthless; and they must either make a new arrangement, or,
in insisting on holding the ice company to the existing contract, they
would ruin the ice company and thereby at the same time ruin
themselves. It would be very strange if under such a condition of
things the existing contract, which unexpected events had rendered
of no value, could stand in the way of a new arrangement, and
constitute a bar to any new contract which should provide for a price
that would enable both parties to safe their interests. 9
A U.S. Supreme Court case, United States v. Cook, 70 also
indicates the effect of unforeseen natural phenomena on the pre-
existing duty rule. In this case, the unforeseen phenomenon was
the San Francisco Earthquake. The plaintiff was the executor of
the estate of the architect for a federal building to be erected in
" 47 Mich. at 492, 11 N.W. at 285.
167 Id.
768 61 Minn. 482, 63 N.W. 1105 (1895).
47 Mich. at 493, 11 N.W. at 285-86.
170 257 U.S. 523 (1922).
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San Francisco. The architect's contract called for him to be paid
a fee of 5 percent of the actual cost of construction. The earth-
quake and fire delayed construction 3 years and drove the cost of
labor and materials to a premium. Congress authorized that the
contractor be reimbursed his additional costs and expenses
caused by the delay and increased prices. Under this congres-
sional authorization the contractor was paid an additional
$101,907.66.
The architect's estate sued to recover 5 percent of the addi-
tional cost awarded to the contractor, some $5,095.38. The Su-
preme Court upheld the Court of Claims' finding for the architect
on the ground that the congressional change of the original agree-
ment was justified and that the increased costs were, therefore, a
valid part of the actual costs which formed the basis of the archi-
tect's fee.
Another case showing the influence of unforeseen natural
phenomena is Tussing v. Smith. 7' There a mortgagor renego-
tiated his loan with the mortgagee because 3 successive years of
violent storms had reduced the value of the land to far below the
amount of the mortgage. In the suit by the mortgagee to enforce
the terms of the original mortgage, the mortgagor argued the
modification. On the first hearing, the court found that the modi-
fication was not binding because of the pre-existing duty rule.
However, on rehearing, the court reappraised the situation and
enforced the oral modification of the mortgage. In its opinion on
rehearing7 2 the court emphasized the effect of the 3 years of
storms and found consideration for the modification in making
extensive repairs to the premises.
C. Political Acts
The leading case permitting the changed circumstances ex-
ception to the pre-existing duty rule to apply to political acts is
Blakeslee v. Board of Water Commissioners.173 It dealt with the
economic impact of World War I on a construction contract.
Blakeslee agreed to construct a dam for the City of Hartford
within 33 months. At the time of entering into the contract, both
1' 125 Fla. 578, 171 So. 238 (1936).
172 Id.
"1 106 Conn. 642, 139 A. 106 (1927). Compare Blakeslee with Central London Prop-
erty Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd., [1956] 1 K.B. 256, where the court used a
reliance theory, rather than the unforeseen circumstances exception. See note 124 infra.
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parties understood that great amounts of earth and rock would
have to be moved, which would require large quantities of high
explosives. Further, the parties understood that great amounts of
coal would be necessary to operate heavy equipment and that
much steel, concrete, and pipe would be required to complete the
job. Moreover, it was understood that much skilled and unskilled
labor would be employed. Shortly thereafter the United States
became involved in the war. The result of the national prepara-
tion for an eventual entry into the conflict was an extreme shor-
tage of labor and materials. Additionally, embargoes on transpor-
tation prevented shipment of goods that were available. As a
practical matter, construction became impossible.
Consequently, Blakeslee and the defendant negotiated a sec-
ond agreement. The defendant agreed to waive the original con-
tract's liguidated damages clause if Blakeslee would proceed with
the construction. The defendant also promised to seek legislation
which would permit it to pay Blakeslee the additional costs re-
sulting from the war's interference (such a bill was subsequently
passed, without the defendant's aid). The dam was eventually
completed, but at a cost of $159,000 more than had been agreed
to in the original contract. When the defendant refused to pay the
added amount, Blakeslee sued.
The defendant demurred to the complaint, asserting, among
other things, that there had been no consideration for the alleged
contract for increased compensation because the plaintiffs had,
"performed no services or furnished no material except those re-
quired under that contract [the original one]."'"4
The Connecticut court found that the plaintiff had indeed
stated a cause of action because consideration could be found.
The court specifically brought the case within the changed or
unforeseen circumstances exception, relying on King v. Duluth,
Missabe & Northern Railway.'1
5
Another example of the effect of war involved the Commod-
ity Credit Corporation. Although Mid-State Products Co. v.
Commodity Credit Corp.7 6 takes a radically different analytical
approach to modification, it is in essence in accord with tradi-
1,4 106 Conn. at 647, 139 A. at 108.
61 Minn. 482, 63 N.W. 1105 (1895). Compare King with Transatlantic Financing
Corp. v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 725 (D.D.C. 1965); Commercial Car Line v. Ander-
son, 224 Ill. App. 187 (1922).
176 196 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1952).
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tional doctrine. At the urging of Commodity Credit the plaintiff
entered the egg powdering business. Commodity Credit agreed to
pay a fixed price for the eggs the plaintiff powdered. Subse-
quently, the price of eggs dropped dramatically so that Commod-
ity Credit (a so-called federal corporation, i.e., the United States
government) was forced to subsidize the falling egg prices and, at
the same time, also pay the high fixed price to the plaintiff. The
defendant forced renegotiation and reduced the price paid to the
plaintiff.
The plaintiff sued for the difference in price, alleging it had
no choice but to go along with the defendant's demands for a
lower price because the defendant was its only customer. The
court found for the defendant, upholding the modification. How-
ever, the court avoided the consideration problem by saying no
new consideration was required for the modification. On the other
hand, the court revealed at least some allegiance to standard
doctrine when it cited the existing emergency wartime conditions
as justifying the forced renegotiation, because the defendant was
required to act in the public interest.
The point is that although the court articulated its holding
by saying no consideration was required for the modification, it
also could easily have reconciled its analysis with the traditional
doctrine of the pre-existing duty rule by means of the changed
circumstances exception. ,77
D. Labor Strife
Some courts have found a strike or similar labor difficulty to
be a sufficient change in circumstances or unforeseen event to
come within the exception. An early such case was Guaranty Iron
& Steel Co. v. Leyden.'Ts The plaintiff agreed to do iron work for
the defendant's building. A strike occurred which delayed work
that had to be completed before the plaintiff could do his iron
work. When the plaintiff could finally commence work, costs were
considerably higher than had been anticipated so he slowed his
work on the defendant's building by diverting his energies to
later-acquired jobs which were profitable. The defendant prom-
ised to pay more for the completion of the work on his building if
the plaintiff would proceed without interruption.
' See also Stovall v. Williams, 100 Ariz. 1, 409 P.2d 711 (1966), where the govern-
ment's economic influence as a major purchaser forced a contract modification which was
subsequently upheld in favor of an attaching creditor.
"1 235 Ill. App. 191 (1924), cert. denied, 236 Ill. App. 631 (1925).
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The plaintiff sued to collect the higher amount and was met
by the plea of no consideration (i.e., the pre-existing duty rule).
The court found for the plaintiff. It reasoned that the delay in the
plaintiff's starting work, caused by the strike, justified the plain-
tiffs withdrawal. Therefore, his going ahead with the work, de-
spite a right to withdraw, constituted consideration for the defen-
dant's promise.
A similar result was reached in Unitec Corp. v. Beatty Saf-
way Scaffold Co. 7' There, the plaintiff offered to construct ra-
domes for the defendant at a cost of $14,000 for materials only or
for $25,500 if the plaintiff supplied labor as well as materials. The
defendant accepted the labor and material formula and a written
contract was drawn. Two days after the work began, the plain-
tiff's employees refused to cross a picket line at the job site.
According to the plaintiff, the parties orally modified their agree-
ment by switching to the $14,000 contract for materials only.
In the plaintiffs suit to enforce the modification, the defen-
dant asserted that there had been no consideration for the modifi-
cation. The court found for the plaintiff, saying that a mutual
partial rescission of a bilateral executory contract is always sup-
ported by consideration in that each party forgoes its rights
against the other.
Another case recognizing the impact of labor difficulties, but
granting relief on grounds of mutual rescission rather than under
the changed or unforeseen circumstances exception was the sub-
ject of some severe criticism. 80 The case is Siebring Manufactur-
174 358 F.2d 470 (9th Cir. 1966).
' See Hudson, supra note 1. Referring to Siebring and other Iowa cases it is said that
[tihe Iowa court, at least in result, has considerably weakened, if not killed
the doctrine of consideration in cases involving the discharge or modification
of existing duties. It is suggested, however, that although there may be
agreement as to the justice of the result as individual cases referred to herein,
a proposition in some doubt, the bending of doctrines, the inconsistency and
lack of correlation and citation between cases where basically the same func-
tional problem is presented, and the lack of specific articulation of the
court's policy reasons for reaching results in certain cases, makes it more
difficult for the practitioner or member of the public to predict what the
court will do with the case in the future.
Id. at 14. The impact of this criticism is tempered by the author's treatment of modifica-
tion of a contract and discharge of a liquidated debt by the payment of a lesser amount
as interchangeable, concepts, or, to use his words, "basically the same functional prob-
lem." He thus indulges in the confusion alluded to in the introduction to this article.
Hudson correctly criticizes the circuitous reasoning of the rescission analysis at other
points in his work, but he could not be more inaccurate in his condemnation of the Iowa
court for pursuing individual justice over consistency. The Siebring case is just, well
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ing Co. v. Carlson Hybrid Corn Co. "I There the plaintiff con-
tracted to sell corn crib roofs to the defendant at prices of $60 per
roof or $44 per roof depending on the size. The plaintiff alleged
that 2 weeks later there was another contract between the parties,
raising the prices to $72 and $50 per roof. Between the two con-
tracts a serious steel strike had developed, and the plaintiff was
forced to buy steel at black market prices. The plaintiff and de-
fendant had discussed the new market situation, and it was as-
serted that the defendant agreed to pay the higher prices and pass
them along to its customers.
In the plaintiff's suit to collect the higher price, the defen-
dant pleaded that there was no consideration for the second con-
tract. The court found for the plaintiff, reasoning that there was
no need for new consideration where a former contract was merely
modified. The mutual releases of the old contract were sufficient
to bind each party to the new contract.'82
E. Economic Fluctuation
The landmark case in finding drastically altered market con-
ditions sufficient to bring a case within the changed or unforeseen
circumstances exception to the pre-existing duty rule deals di-
rectly with a changed market and also comes close to dealing with
unforeseen circumstances of classic proportion. The case, Bishop
v. Busse, 13 deals with a contract entered into a few days after the
founded in doctrine (the changed or unforeseen circumstances exception to the pre-
existing duty rule, not the rescission analysis), and leads to a high degree of predictability.
This article hopes to demonstrate incidentally that justice, legality, and consistency
of decision need not be mutually exclusive goals. It is this writer's belief that quite the
contrary is more likely the case and that law and justice are twin concepts.
" 246 Iowa 923, 70 N.W.2d 149 (1955).
2 Compare Kovacich v. Metals Bank & Trust Co., 139 Mont., 449, 365 P.2d 639
(1961) and Siebring with Western Lithograph Co. v. Vanomar Producers, 185 Cal. 366,
197 P. 103 (1921), where increased cost of labor and materials did not relieve the promisor:
Whether the rule of these cases [referring to Michaud v. McGregor, 61 Minn.
198, 63 N.W. 479 (1895) and King v. Duluth M. & N. Ry., 61 Minn. 482, 63
N.W. 1105 (1895)] be correct or not, it has no application to a case where
the increased costs of the contractor are due merely to fluctuations in the
market price of labor and materials. The risk of such fluctuation is a burden
which he necessarily contemplates and assumes when he makes the contract.
185 Cal. at 370-71, 197 P. at 105. To see how courts have dealt with remarkable cost
changes, compare Sasso v. K.G. & G. Realty & Constr. Co., 98 Conn. 571, 120 A. 158 (1923)
(rescission analysis); Frank C. Clemens Plumbing Co. v. H.C. Huber Constr. Co., 73 Ohio
L. Abs. 7, 136 N.E.2d 382 (Ohio Ct. App. 1954); San Gabriel Valley Ready-Mixt v.
Casillas, 142 Cal. App. 2d 137, 298 P.2d 76 (1956); and W.D. Miller Constr. Co. v. J.G.
Watts Constr. Co., 223 Ore. 504, 355 P.2d 215 (1960).
-- 69 Il. 403 (1873).
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great Chicago Fire of October 9, 1871. The contract was for the
construction of a house, and the price for each kind of work was
set out with specificity. After the work was under way, prices rose
sharply. The builder alleged a second contract in which the owner
promised to pay any additional amounts the rising market de-
manded. In the suit by the builder, the modified contract was
attacked as lacking consideration. The Illinois Supreme Court
found consideration. Its reasoning deserves a full report:
In this case, brick had risen from $15 in the wall to $22 or $23,
and labor and materials had also advanced in the same proportion.
And the evidence shows that if appellees had completed the building
at the prcies first agreed upon, they would have lost about $8,000;
that, on appellees failing to perform the contract, appellant could
have recovered the damages occasioned by the breach. But this he
may have considered of less advantage to him than the completion
of the building, and if so, that of itself would have been a sufficient
consideration to support the new agreement. It is held that one
promise is sufficient to support another, and that where a party will
derive a benefit from the performance of a contract, that is a consid-
eration for a promise to pay for such benefit.
Again, the rise in the price of materials for building to so large
an extent was, no doubt, according to the law of demand and supply,
occasioned by the scarcity of buildings or a much larger demand
than the supply, and if so, rents must have been enhanced to an
extent equal to the rise in labor and materials. And if this was true,
then we could see a strong inducement to change the contract rather
than not have the building erected. If he had not agreed to the
change, he was notified that appellees would not erect the building,
and he would have been left to his legal remedy for the recovery of
damages for the breach of contract, and he would have been de-
prived of the profits derived from enhanced rents, if there were such.
But whether there were such increased rents or not, the mutual
promises formed a sufficient consideration to support the new con-
tract. 1
Clearly, the court was motivated by the changed market con-
ditions. The court neatly argued the consideration question. No-
tice, however, the court's concern with the owner's inducement
to enter into the second contract. It is this concern that the sec-
ond contract was freely given that brings Bishop in line with the
other cases and again demonstrates the true thrust of the pre-
existing duty rule as a weapon against abusive dealing.
A second case, Barr v. Snyder,"5 shows a slightly different
facet of the pre-existing duty rule's relationship with the concept
Id. at 407-08.
18 294 S.W.2d 4 (Mo. 1956).
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of fair dealing. Barr agreed to purchase an apartment building
and some furniture located therein from Snyder. Soon after, the
parties amended their agreement to permit Snyder to sell some
of the furniture independently. He sold it and at the closing cred-
ited the buyer, Barr, with the proceeds of the sale. However, Barr
refused to accept the closing statement, allegedly because the
furniture had been sold for less than full value. Instead, Barr filed
suit for conversion of the money and note that had been placed
in escrow as provided in the original contract.
As the conversion suit made its way through the courts, the
value of the building increased greatly. And almost 5 years after
the date of the contract, the buyer, Barr, was permitted to file an
amended petition abandoning her conversion claim and seeking
specific performance instead.
The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed a lower court's de-
nial of specific performance to Mrs. Barr on the merits of the
claim. It found that she was not entitled to specific performance
because she herself had refused to honor the amended contract.
The court specifically withheld its opinion on the propriety of the
plaintiff's amending her suit after having pursued it so long on
the conversion theory. 1
6
The court found consideration for the modification in that
the obligations of both parties had been affected. In effect, the
court used the mutual rescission analysis. However, one cannot
help but notice the court's concern with the relationship between
the sharp increase in the value of the building and the plaintiff's
decision to amend the cause of action so she could keep the now
valuable building. The court seemed to choose the mutual rescis-
sion analysis as a convenient means of enforcing the second con-
tract, and preventing the plaintiff from profiting from her own
intransigence.
Another case opting for the rescission analysis also demon-
strates that the exigencies of a free market economy will influence
the application of the pre-existing duty rule. The case is Williams
v. Cassidy,5 7 and it deals with the sale of real estate by contract.
In October of 1928, the defendant agreed to sell land to the plain-
tiff for $1,600, payable at the rate of $20 down and $20 per month.
I' d. at 11.
's 237 Iowa 1042, 23 N.W.2d 423 (1946). For the influence of the Great Depression of
1929, see Ewing v. Benson, 281 N.W. 197 (Iowa 1938).
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The plaintiff took possession and paid $676 by March, 1933. At
that time the parties entered into a second agreement which
called for the plaintiff to pay, in addition to the $676 already
paid, only $500 more at the reduced rate of $5 down and $5 per
month. The plaintiff adhered to the terms of the second contract
and fulfilled them. After this full performance, the plaintiff sued
to force the defendant to execute a deed.
The defendant alleged that there was no consideration for the
second contract because of the pre-existing duty rule. The Su-
preme Court of Iowa affirmed a decree in favor of the plaintiff. It
is clear that economic conditions entered into the court's analy-
sis. The court, at the threshold of its opinion, took judicial notice
of the depression and the resulting diminution of real estate val-
ues. The court showed how the depressed economic conditions
directed its analysis and at the same time fell in line with the
concern in Lingenfelder with freedom from abusive dealing, when
it said:
There is no evidence on either side as to what the value of the home
was in 1933 but even a superficial recognition of the conditions then
existing persuades us to the view that there may have been
impelling reasons on both sides for the supplemental contract
Is"
Thus again, the relationship of the changed or unforeseen
circumstances exception to the pre-existing duty rule is observed
in its function of assuring a court that the second agreement was
freely given-at least to the extent that the promisor was com-
pelled by market realities rather than the promisee's abusive tac-
tics.
A leading opinion taking the position that economic change
cannot justify avoiding the pre-existing duty deals with the en-
forceability of an agreement to reduce rent.'89 The case, Levine v.
Blumenthal, 0 adheres to the conventional view of contract in a
"1 237 Iowa at 1048, 23 N.W.2d at 427 (emphasis added). Contra, Westland Constr.
Co. v. Chris Berg, Inc., 35 Wash. 2d 824, 215 P.2d 683 (1950).
"I The duty to pay rent is more akin to the duty to pay a sum certain than it is to
the typical executory bilateral contract, which is the major concern of this analysis. This
is especially true in view of the traditional treatment of lease provisions as independent.
The case is included here not to perpetuate the confusion of the concepts consistently
decried. Rather, it is used because it succinctly and clearly states its position. For analysis
consistent with the analysis of executory bilateral contract duties in a lease situation, see
Priddie v. Goudchaux, 112 S.W.2d 492 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938); Liebreich v. Tyler State
Bank & Trust Co., 100 S.W. 152 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
-1- 117 N.J.L. 23, 186 A. 457 (1936), aff'd 117 N.J.L. 426, 189 A. 54 (1937).
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free market economy. It cites earlier cases enforcing modifica-
tions responding to economic crises, but disagrees with those de-
cisions. However, the disagreement is patently a matter of policy.
The landlord's position was that the agreement to reduce rent was
unenforceable for lack of consideration. The court found for the
landlord, saying:
They [referring to cases applying the changed circumstances excep-
tion to such facts] exhibit the modern tendency, especially in the
matter of rent reductions, to depart from the strictness of the basic
common-law rule and give effect to what has been termed a "reason-
able" modification of the primary contract.
So tested, the secondary agreement at issue is not supported by
a valid consideration; and it therefore created no legal obligation.
General economic adversity, however disastrous it may be in its
individual consequences, is never a warrant for judicial abrogation
of this primary principle of the law of contracts.''
Even if one takes the view that courts should not use contract
law to make economic policy, one must recognize that such judi-
cial regulation occurs. Here, the changed or unforeseen circum-
stances exception to the pre-existing duty rule became the vehicle
by which courts could express their beliefs as to the proper distri-
bution of the impact of the depression. Courts believing the
promisor should bear the risk applied the pre-existing duty rule;
courts believing the opposite applied the exception.
The point is, again, that inquiry beyond the questions of
contract theory into the facts surrounding the second contract is
necessary to determine the legality of a modification. Such in-
quiry reveals that changed or unforeseen circumstances affecting
the performance of the original contract can control the applica-
bility of the pre-existing duty rule and thus eventually determine
the enforceabiltiy of a modification of the original contract.
CONCLUSION
It is worth observing that even the most obscure technical
legal theory is bottomed on principles of fairness and justice. The
primary objective of this analysis has been to resolve the appar-
ently inconsistent applications of the pre-existing duty rule. The
seemingly contradictory decisions are resolved with the discovery
that courts use the pre-existing duty rule to prevent abusive deal-
ing. Few courts reveal their true purpose in invoking the rule to
deny enforcement of a particular agreement. And thus, the pre-
"' 117 N.J.L. at 29, 186 A. at 459 (citations omitted).
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existing duty rule has been misunderstood and undeservedly con-
demned. This disapproval culminated in UCC 2-209(1) and The
Restatement (Second) section 89D dispensing with the require-
ment of consideration for modifications. The drafter's comments
to both these, works make clear that the changes permitting modi-
fication without consideration are to overcome the pre-existing
duty rule.'
Without question, this particular reform fostered by the
Code and Restatement is valuable. It serves to bring the law into
conformity with what is deemed good contemporary commercial
practice. Further, the language of the section 89D and the com-
ments to 2-209 indicate that questions of fair dealing are the
primary criteria of modification. The reforms, however, do not go
far enough. More exact language in the Code and Restatement
could have clarified the pre-existing duty rule, and with it, the
general doctrine of consideration. Such explicit redrafting would
have served the commercial world as well. Entrepreneurs would
have been given clearer guidelines by which to conduct their deal-
ings. Instead, the drafters chose to avoid the problems and ac-
complish their goal by eliminating consideration as a requirement
for enforceable modifications. In this regard they have repeated
the errors of the past.
Whether or not additional revisions are undertaken is of sec-
ondary concern. What is important is that the pre-existing duty
rule and the right to modify executory contracts be understood.
These fellow concepts may be better understood if the rules are
stated:
Performance of, or a promise to perform an existing
contractual duty is consideration for a promise of extra
compensation for its performance if:
1) there was no abusive dealing in eliciting the
promise of extra compensation;
(2) the promisee of the promise of extra compen-
sation relied on the promise. Changed or unforeseen cir-
cumstances discovered or arising after formation of the
original contract and which make the performance of
the duty under the original contract subject to a reason-
able doubt, rebut any natural inference of abusive deal-
ing which surrounds the promise of extra compensation.
192 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-209, Comment 1; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 89D, comment a at 211 (Tent. Draft Nos. 1-7, 1973).
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